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ABSTRACT
A comparative quantitative assessment is made of the nuclear weapons proliferation
risk between various nuclear reactor/fuel cycle concepts using a probabilistic
method. The work presented details quantified proliferation resistance metrics of a
pressurized water reactor (PWR), a PWR utilizing thorium as a fertile component of
the nuclear fuel (Radkowsky Thorium Reactor-RTR) and a high temperature, gas
cooled, reactor with a pebble bed core (PBMR). This probabilistic method permits
integration of all aspects of fissile material proliferation in formulating an overall
estimate of relative proliferation risk. The reactor/fuel cycle concepts are examined
along a "weapons-useable plutonium diverted from spent reactor fuel" proliferation
pathway in order to determine these values, and concepts with low values of this
estimate are favorable for continued development in terms of lowered proliferation
potential.
A determination is also made of those reactor/fuel cycle technical features that
contribute the most to minimizing the proliferation success within these risk
estimates. Identification of areas affecting these "importance measures", (i.e.,
reactor/fuel cycle practices, technical features, safeguard practices and resource
allocations) allows for further research into these vital areas.
The example and results presented in this work are an illustration of an integrated
analysis utilizing a probabilistic method. The subjectivity used in determining various
factors and confidence levels for this analysis is based on the author's own
reasoning, opinion and judgment in light of political, economic and technical
considerations. The results, implications and conclusions concerning different
reactor/fuel cycles are applicable only within the context of this subjectivity as
applied within this methodology.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 The Need For An Assessment
Two very different pathways exist for the future direction of fission-based
commercial nuclear power. Along one route, nuclear power's share of global
electricity production shrinks and nuclear power in the latter part of the 21st century
will be prematurely abandoned under the guise of controversy and political
instability. The second route, however, brings nuclear power to the forefront of the
global energy crisis in the best of terms. Along this route, nuclear power's share of
the energy production grows dramatically and the industry enjoys success while
helping to bolster the energy needs of populations for generations to come.
In this case, nuclear power possesses a vast potential growth opportunity,
capable of minimizing the disparity between projections of energy supply and
demand on a global basis. Solutions to humankind's energy problems will require a
significant increase in the availability of energy, and in turn a renewed interest in
increasing the nuclear share in energy production. However, several key
developmental factors have a direct impact on and will continue to dominate the
implementation and level of this increase. Former President Clinton's Committee of
Advisors on Science and Technology looked at these factors and concluded that:
"Fission's future expandability is in doubt in the United States
and many other regions of the world because of concerns
about high costs, reactor-accident risks, radioactive-waste
management, and potential links to the spread of nuclear
weapons [1-1]."
9For nuclear power to be successful well into this century, specific measures must be
undertaken to analyze these factors and provide quantitative assessments of their
impact so that informed decisions may be made to guide the future of nuclear power.
This work addresses the factor of proliferation through a comparative
quantitative assessment of the nuclear weapons proliferation risk between various
nuclear reactor and fuel cycle concepts using a probabilistic method.
1.2 World-Wide Civilian Nuclear Power Status
Trends in the world's population and energy use during the past century show
dramatic and relatively parallel increases in both. These trends are expected to
continue in the near future, and projected world energy consumption in 2020 will be
about 60% higher than it is today, as seen in Figure 1-1 [1-2].
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Figure 1-1: World Energy Consumption, 1970-2020
The demand for electricity is expected to increase more rapidly than the
demand for other forms of energy throughout the world and nearly double by 2020
[1-3]. To meet projected electricity demand over the next two decades, the United
States must alone have in place between 1,300 and 1,900 new electric plants [1-4].
Nuclear power is hoped to become an important part of future strategies of
energy production, thereby alleviating the global concern about the increase in
greenhouse concentrations in the atmosphere, and shifting the heavy reliance away
from carbon fuels. Among the developed industrialized nations, nuclear energy is
presently an important contributor to electrical energy production. As of June 2001,
11
there were 439 nuclear power plants in operation with a total net installed capacity of
351 gigawatts-electric [GW(e)] and 33 nuclear power plants under construction. In
2000, nuclear power supplied more than 1/6 of global electrical energy production,
and, as seen in Figure 1-2 [1-5], a substantial 30 percent of the electrical needs in
Western Europe [1-6].
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Figure 1-2: Nuclear Share of Electricity Generation by Country in 2000
1.3 The Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons
There are five "declared" nuclear weapon states under the provisions of the
1968 Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT): the United States, Russia, Great
Britain, France, and China. In addition to the declared states, there are three "de
facto" states: India, Pakistan, and Israel. Both India and Pakistan tested nuclear
devices in May 1998; Israel is widely assumed to have a nuclear weapons capability.
None of the de facto states have joined the NPT, however, they are all considered
capable of deploying and detonating a nuclear weapon [1-7].
The NPT defines proliferation as the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear
weapons or other nuclear explosive devices by countries that currently do not
possess them [1-8]. As the nature of the world political and economic status
becomes increasingly unstable, further nuclear weapons proliferation is a source of
great emphasis in the international community. This emphasis focuses on the lack
of adequate controls of fissile material, the international growth of civilian produced
fissile materials inventories, the development of a nuclear weapons capability by
states not members of the NPT and clandestine programs by rogue states. The fear
is that those currently without the capability will engage in illicit new programs, as in
the case of Iraq, Iran, Libya and North Korea. All are suspected of seeking nuclear
weapons but are currently under some form of international monitoring and
technology constraints. The potential addition of nuclear weapon's capabilities to
these states or those who might use them haphazardly, as in the case of a terrorist,
has increased the scope of research on new technologies to counter such threats
and the scrutiny on further development within the nuclear energy sector as
mentioned earlier. This scrutiny is aggravated by the similarity of the nuclear
materials and facilities involved in similar processes of developing either nuclear
power or nuclear weapons capabilities.
1.3.1 Nuclear Weapons Overview
Nuclear fission occurs when the nuclei of certain isotopes of very heavy
elements capture neutrons. The nuclei of these isotopes are just barely stable and
the addition of a small amount of energy to one by an outside neutron will cause it to
promptly split into two roughly equal pieces, with the release of a great deal of
energy and several new neutrons. If, on average, one neutron from each fission is
captured and successfully produces fission then a chain reaction is produced and a
critical state exists. If there is a sufficient concentration of atoms of fissile isotopes,
known as a 'critical mass' (CM), this reaction will be self-sustaining. A critical mass
is the smallest amount of material required for a chain reaction. This is the concept
behind the commercial nuclear power system. If, on average, "more" than one
neutron from each fission triggers another fission, then the number of neutrons and
the rate of energy production will increase exponentially with time, leading to a
supercritical state. This concept forms the basis for developing nuclear weapons
capable of creating extremely powerful explosions.
Many conditions must be met before fission can be used to create powerful
explosions through nuclear weapons:
. The number of neutrons lost to fission (from non-fission producing neutron
captures, or escape from the fissionable mass) must be kept low.
. The speed with which the chain reaction proceeds must be very fast. The
time between the emission of a neutron and its induction of a fission is
about 10 nanoseconds (1 x1 08 [sec]) [1-9]. A fission bomb is in a race
with itself to successfully fission most of the material in the bomb before it
blows apart. The degree to which a bomb design succeeds in this race
determines its efficiency.
. The process of assembling the supercritical mass must occur in
significantly less time than the average interval between spontaneous
fissions to have a reasonable chance of succeeding. The time required is
known as the insertion time. This problem is difficult to accomplish due to
the very large change in reactivity required in going from a subcritical state
to a supercritical one.
Highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu) are the essential
ingredients of nuclear weapons. Theoretically, a nuclear device can be constructed
using HEU with a 235U fraction ranging from as low as 10% to 100% or plutonium
with any isotopic concentration. With the proper isotopic concentrations however,
several kilograms [kg] of plutonium, or several times the amount of HEU, is enough
to make a nuclear bomb with a sufficient yield. The yield of a nuclear weapon is
expressed in kilotons [kT], one kiloton being the energy produced when 1,000 tons
of the high explosive TNT is detonated.
With access to sufficient quantities of weapons-useable materials, most
nations and even some sub national groups would be technically capable of
producing a nuclear weapon with varying degrees of design sophistication and yield.
1.3.2 Types of Nuclear Weapons
The two basic types of nuclear weapons are the gun and implosion designs.
Both types use fissile material and several designs make use of the fusion of lighter
elements to improve weapon efficiency and "boost" the energy release. Similar
components are present in each design: chemical explosives (or in the case of the
gun-type, propellants) to assemble the fissile material into a supercritical mass that
will sustain an explosive chain reaction; non-fissile materials to reflect neutrons and
tamp the explosion; electronics to trigger the explosion; a neutron generator to start
the nuclear detonation at the appropriate time; and associated command, control
and if needed guidance systems.
The gun-type weapon is the simplest method for satisfying the requirements
listed earlier for successful detonation of a nuclear weapon. Gun-type designs use
235U or 233U as the fissile material. The fissile material is kept in the form of two
hemispheres which are each subcritical, but which form a highly supercritical mass
when brought together as in Figure 1-3 [1-10].
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Figure 1-3: Gun-Type Design
Tampers, a heavy material around the fissile material to contain it for the time
needed to give the desired yield and act as a neutron reflector, are located around
both hemispheres. The nuclear explosion is initiated by detonating a high explosive
propellant behind one of the hemispheres, which accelerates rapidly down the barrel
toward the other. At the instant the two hemispheres meet, a burst of neutrons is
injected to initiate the chain reaction.
The primary advantage of gun-type design is simplicity. It is as close to a
foolproof design as technology allows.
The drawbacks to the gun-type design are:
" The lack of compression, which requires large amounts of fissionable
material, and leads to low efficiency. The gun-type design is extremely
inefficient in its use of fissile material, as only about 3 percent of the
material is fissioned on average [1-11].
. Only 235U and 233U can be used due to the slow insertion speed.
" The weight and length of the gun barrel makes the weapon heavy and
fairly long.
The gun-type design is highly predictable as was evident by its use in the
bomb dropped on Hiroshima without testing. The gun-type weapon used at
Hiroshima contained about 42 [kg] of 80 percent enriched 2 35U and yielded 12.5 [kT]
[1-12].
The implosion-type design makes use of the fact that increasing the density of
the fissile material decreases the critical mass required for a supercritical state. This
is the principle employed in most modern nuclear weapons' designs of the five
declared nuclear states. As is seen in Figure 1-4, the fissile material is in the form of
a small subcritical sphere, surrounded by a tamper. Outside this is a high explosive,
which is detonated simultaneously at a number of points on the exterior to produce
the symmetrical inward-traveling shock wave. This "implosion" compresses the
fissile material two to three times its normal density. At the moment of maximum
compression, a burst of neutrons is injected to initiate the chain reaction.
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Figure 1-4 Implosion-Type Design
The primary advantages of the implosion-type design are:
. A high insertion speed allowing materials with high spontaneous fission
rates (i.e. plutonium) to be used
. A high density, leading to a very efficient weapon and allowing weapons to
be made with relatively small amounts of material.
. The potential for light weight designs-in the best designs, only several
kilograms of high explosive are needed to compress the core.
The principal drawback to the implosion-type design is its complexity and the
precision required to make it work. Implosion designs take extensive research and
testing, and require high precision machining and electronics. The crucial timing and
simultaneous detonation of the high explosives leads to increased concern over the
predictability of the yield or a complete malfunction of the weapon. This is the type
of weapon dropped on Nagasaki, but not before it was tested in the New Mexico
desert. The implosion-type weapon used at Nagasaki yielded 20 [kT] [1-13].
1.3.3 Weapons-Useable Material
Three isotopes of HEU and plutonium, 233U, 235U and 239 Pu, are practical for
use in the design of nuclear weapons, however not all can be used in each design.
As was mentioned earlier, 235U and 233U are the only fissile materials that can
effectively be used in a gun-type design, while all three isotopes can be used in the
implosion-type design.
Of these materials, only 23 5U occurs in nature. Bombarding other isotopes
with neutrons produces 233U and 239 Pu. Figure 1-5 illustrates the production of 233 U
and 239Pu:
n + 232 Th - 233 Th P (22m) , 233 Pa p~(27.4d) _ 233 U (160,000yrs)
n + 238 U _> 239 U (24m) > 239 Np P~(2.4d) 4 239 Pu (24,000yrs)
Figure 1-5: Production of 233U and 239Pu
The creation of this "weapons-useable material" occurs in the defense related
reactors solely devoted to their production or operation of commercial nuclear power
facilities. Nominally, the manufacture of nuclear weapons requires either:
. Pure uranium metal at very high enrichment levels (though the HEU
category starts at 20% 23 5U, weapons-grade uranium comprises 93% or
more 23 5U), produced in enrichment plants designed and operated solely
for this purpose.
. Pure plutonium metal preferably with a very high proportion of 239 pU
(weapons-grade plutonium comprises less than 7% 240 Pu), produced in
reactors designed and operated to produce low burn-up plutonium, and
separated from spent fuel or irradiation targets. Within weapons-grade,
there is the sub-category of super-grade plutonium, containing no more
than 3% 240Pu.
These manufactured materials are very different to those normally produced
in civil programs:
. Low enriched uranium (LEU) typically used in light water reactors (LWRs)
is in the range of 2-5% 235U; the utilization of LEU as a source material for
weapons would require chemical and metallurgical processes, increasing
the time frame for the production of weapons-useable material significantly
compared to the use of HEU as the source material.
. Reactor-grade plutonium from the operation of LWRs is around 25% 240 Pu
or higher.
Table 1-1 summarizes the isotopic concentrations of various types of
weapons-useable material [1-14]:
Table 1-1: Approximate Isotopic Composition of Various Grades of Material
Grade Isotope
233u 235u 238Pu 23 9 Pu 2 40 Pu 24 1 Pu 242Pu
Super -- 0.97700 -- 0.98000 0.02000 -- --
Weapon .98000 0.93500 0.00012 0.93800 0.05800 0.00350 0.00022
Reactor -- -- 0.01300 0.60300 0.24300 0.09100 0.05000
Table 1-2 summarizes the critical masses for bare (unreflected) spheres of
fissionable materials [1-15]:
Table 1-2: Critical Masses for Bare (Unreflected) Spheres of Various Materials
Material Critical Mass
233u 16 kg
235u 52 kg
239Pu 10 kg
(alpha phase)
The critical mass values can be reduced by effective tampers and highly
sophisticated implosion designs maximizing the density to critical mass inverse
relationship.
To better understand the pathways for obtaining weapons-useable material, a
distinction must be drawn between the kinds of nuclear materials created specifically
for use in nuclear weapons. The International Atomic Energy Administration (IAEA)
has developed the following definitions for each type of material. The IAEA divides
nuclear material into three categories, based on the degree of threat they pose using
the following definitions [1-16]:
. Direct Use: Nuclear material that can be used in nuclear explosives with
relatively little further processing (e.g., separated plutonium, HEU found at
reprocessing and mixed oxide fuel (MOX) fabrication plants as well as
research and development (R&D) facilities).
. Indirect Use: Material that can be converted into nuclear explosive material
by isotopic enrichment or irradiation in a nuclear reactor (i.e., LEU found at
enrichment plants and power reactors).
. Irradiated Direct Use: Nuclear fuel that has already been used and which
contains direct-use materials (Pu and LEU) that can be made suitable for
explosive use by chemical reprocessing (i.e., spent fuel).
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1.3.4 Proliferator Profiles
This work focuses upon the example of the proliferating national state, which
is assumed to exist; however, the analytical methods suggested here can be
consistently applied to other types of proliferators and end states as well. A range
of potential proliferators has been postulated from a group of motivated individuals
or terrorists to technologically sophisticated nation states not currently in
possession of nuclear weapons. The types of devices and weapons materials of
greatest interest to them will differ according to their respective capabilities. The
proliferation assessment methods presented here are equally applicable over this
range of possibilities and could be used to quantify the proliferation risk of any
state with varying degrees of weapons interest.
In the simplest of terms, the types of weapons and the time scales for
development involved are intricately tied to the amount of fissile material the
proliferator is able to obtain. The various sources available to the proliferator are
outlined in the context of this work. One of the most overlooked resources of fissile
material exists in the spent fuel from the nuclear power industry. The amount of
weapons-useable material, even from the limited nuclear power industry and the
decades of operation thus far, is almost incomprehensible. At present, in excess of
100 tons [T] of Pu has been separated in reprocessing operations, and more than
1,000 [T] of Pu is still present in spent fuel [1-17]. None of the spent fuel has been
transferred to a mined geologic repository, whether as intact spent fuel or as
reprocessed vitrified fission product waste. At the nominal 10 [kg] of plutonium per
nuclear weapon, 100 [T] of separated plutonium would suffice to make 10,000
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nuclear weapons, while the thousand tons or more in spent fuel would make
100,000 weapons. Clearly, the proliferation risk is not that some terrorist group or
emerging nuclear power will capture all of the spent fuel and build a force of
thousands or hundreds of thousands of nuclear warheads. Rather, the main risk is
that a few tens of kilograms could be produced, diverted, stolen, or even purchased,
to make a few or a few dozen predictable nuclear weapons that could hold even a
large country hostage. This work will further develop the spent fuel approach at
obtaining weapons-useable material in its illustrative example of the risk assessment
method presented.
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1.4 The Approach
A shortcoming of existing proliferation resistance assessments is that
quantification methods for systematic integration have not come into use despite the
clear need for them. Many attempts to quantify risk have been proposed by others.
For example, the time scales for diversion to occur and the costs of weapons
development completed by Heising [1-18], the quality of the material of interest for
weapons application and nuclear weapon energy yield completed by Mark [1-19],
and the material of interest power density and toxicity completed by Galperin, et al.
[1-20], have all been proposed as measures of nuclear weapons proliferation
resistance. More recently, the Task Force on Technological Opportunities To
Increase The Proliferation Resistance of Global Civilian Nuclear Power Systems
(TOPS) of the DOE's Nuclear Energy Research Advisory Council (NERAC)
formulated a set of attributes that are relevant to proliferation resistance. They have
not, however, determined a method for providing a definitive, integrated comparison
of alternative reactor and fuel cycle concepts presently being considered [1-21]. The
most relevant prior probabilistic work is that of Papazoglou, et al., [1-22] where a
probabilistic formulation of nuclear weapons proliferation was made and the
proliferation success probability was proposed as a measure of the reactor/fuel cycle
proliferation amenability of a reactor/fuel cycle concept. Many of the concepts
developed and proposed by these works are borrowed for use in this work. The
most used proposals are those developed in a most recent work, by Golay [1-23],
where the probabilistic methodology and success tree formulation utilized here was
presented in detail.
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This work presents a comparative quantitative assessment of the nuclear
weapons proliferation risk between various nuclear reactor/fuel cycle concepts using
a probabilistic method. Specifically it details the quantified proliferation resistance
metrics of a pressurized water reactor (PWR), a PWR utilizing thorium as a fertile
component of the nuclear fuel (Radkowsky Thorium Reactor-RTR) and a high
temperature, gas cooled, reactor with a pebble bed core (PBMR). This probabilistic
method permits integration of all aspects of fissile material proliferation in formulating
an overall estimate of relative proliferation risk. The reactor/fuel cycle concepts are
examined along a "weapons-useable plutonium diverted from spent reactor fuel"
proliferation pathway in order to determine these values, and concepts with low
values of this estimate are favorable for continued development in terms of lowered
proliferation potential. A determination is also made of those reactor/fuel cycle
technical features that contribute the most to minimizing the proliferation success
within these risk estimates. Identification of areas affecting these "importance
measures", (i.e., reactor/fuel cycle practices, technical features, safeguard practices
and resource allocations) allows for further research into these vital areas.
The example and results presented in this work are an illustration of an
integrated analysis utilizing a probabilistic method. The subjectivity used in
determining various factors and confidence levels for this analysis is based on the
author's own reasoning, opinion and judgment in light of political, economic and
technical considerations. The results, implications and conclusions concerning
different reactor/fuel cycles are applicable only within the context of this subjectivity
as applied within this methodology.
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Chapter 2: Probabilistic Development
2.1 Overview
In order to assess the overall estimate of relative proliferation risk it would be
valuable to identify quantitative metrics that could be used in comparing alternative
reactor and fuel cycle concepts in terms of their nuclear weapons proliferation
potential along various proliferation pathways. In this work, such metrics are
proposed and their use demonstrated utilizing a probabilistic framework.
The concepts presented are developed having in mind well-defined
reactor/fuel cycles. The following development utilizes a success tree structure for
identifying the factors to which proliferation resistance is sensitive, and for
calculating the probability of proliferation success along varying sequences of
events. Knowledge of the sensitive factors can be useful in formulating methods for
resisting proliferation in that focusing anti-proliferation resources upon the factors
that are especially important for proliferation success is likely to be the most effective
way of discouraging proliferation. An estimate of the proliferation success probability
constitutes an integrated quantified metric that can be used for ranking the overall
proliferation likelihoods of alternative reactor and fuel cycle concepts. The following
discussion illustrates how the value of the probabilities of the proliferation success
trees can be estimated under different circumstances and for differing combinations
of tactics of the potential diverters of nuclear weapons materials and of the
safeguarder who resists him. It may be objected that the values of the probabilities
of the success tree events of this work sometimes cannot be estimated very
accurately (e.g., because the outcome of an event may be sensitive to many factors
or because it is poorly understood). However, the logical framework presented here
is useful as a way of stating the current state of knowledge, for identifying areas
where that state may be improved, and for permitting a consistent integrated
comparison of alternative reactor/fuel cycle concepts. Any such comparisons,
regardless of the methods used to make them, are subject to the same
uncertainties, as they are attributes of the state of knowledge; not of the evaluation
method. In order to decide how to allocate resources for technological conceptual
development proliferation resistance comparisons of alternative concepts and tactics
are unavoidable. Thus, the problem facing a decision maker is not that of whether to
utilize uncertain information in evaluating alternatives, but rather is that of ensuring
that it is used in a logically consistent fashion.
The contribution of this work is to provide a framework and example for doing
that, taking into account the contributions of the basic factors to ultimate outcomes,
including the effects of uncertainties. Whether a proliferator will be successful is
highly uncertain when confronted by a combination of proliferation resistant
reactor/fuel cycle features, and vigorous and well-publicized safeguards efforts.
Because of such uncertainty a probabilistic approach to assessment of the anti-
proliferation potential of such a combination and the contribution of proliferation
resistant reactor/fuel cycle features to that potential appears to offer promise.
Particularly when attempting to represent the beliefs of an evaluator of proliferation
resistance a probabilistic evaluation treatment is easily applied in a Bayesian sense.
For these reasons, this work formulates such a treatment and illustrates its
application [2-1].
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2.2 Methodology Presented Here
A success tree is used to evaluate the overall proliferation risk of employing a
nuclear weapon by examining the probabilities of the basic events needed for
success. In this process, we define the desirable top event, Event W-successful
employment of a weapon, all intermediate events and the basic events that could
occur in the successful outcome of the desired top event. Through the Boolean
operators, knowledge of each of the basic event probabilities is sufficient for
knowledge of that of the top event.
The success tree is evaluated to show which combinations of successful
events will guarantee the top event. These combinations of events can be logically
represented by path sets. Thus, a path set merely represents a "path" through the
system from an initiating event to successful completion of the top event. A minimal
path set (MPS) is a path set containing the minimum number of events needed to
guarantee the success of the top event. Evaluation of the minimal path sets will
render a top event probability based on the individual probabilities of the basic
events. Failure of all the minimal path sets for a top event is necessary for failure of
the top event. Thus, for events of similar probability, top events having fewer
minimal paths sets and minimal path sets having many members will be the easiest
to defeat. The minimal path sets can also be utilized to show which basic events
have the most affect on the ultimate outcome of the top event probability and the
sensitivity of this probability based on event uncertainties.
The probability of an event must be quantified in order to use risk assessment
methods for determining the likelihood of occurrence of an event. The beliefs of the
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outcome of an event can be represented in terms of a probability density concerning
the relative likelihood of alternative values of a variable, T. Since T is continuous,
the graph of f(t) is also continuous over the possible range of t as seen in Figure 2-1.
f(t)
Figure 2-1: Probability Density Function
A probability density function (pdf) is constructed such that the area under the
curve bounded by all possible values of t is equal to 1. The probability that T
assumes a value between t1 and t2 can be determined from Equation 2-1:
Pr(t, < T < t 2 )= ft2f(t)dt (2-1)
The probability density function, f(t), represents a continuous random sample
space, and must have the following additional properties:
1. f(t) 0 for all t,
2. f. f (t) dt = 1
The probability of an event may also depend on the outcome or occurrence of
another event. These probabilities are termed conditional probabilities and
dependence exists between the events. The probabilities of dependent events can
be evaluated using Baye's theorem [2-2]:
For two events A and B, the following definitions apply:
Pr(A) = the
Pr(B) = the
Pr(A|B) = the
Pr(BIA) = the
Pr(AB) = the
probability of event A
probability of event B
probability of event A
probability of event B
probability of event A
occurring.
occurring.
occurring given the occurrence of event B.
occurring given the occurrence of event A.
and B occurring.
Utilizing set theory, Pr(AB) is the intersection of the two events:
Pr(AB)Pr(B| A)- Pr(A)Pr(A)
By symmetry, it may be shown that:
Pr(AB)Pr(A IB)=- Pr(B)
Solving for Pr(AB):
Pr(AB) = Pr(A)Pr(BIA) = Pr(B)Pr(AIB)
(2-2)
(2-3)
(2-4)
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2.3 Success Tree Development
2.3.1 Top Event Development
Proliferation can arise in different forms, ranging from material diversion to
explosion of a weapon. In this work, we focus upon the example of the latter event,
but the method presented is applicable to a broad range of end states of potential
interest. We can usefully view proliferation within the context of a success tree,
where ultimate success depends upon the outcomes of several intermediate steps.
Event W-success in employing a nuclear weapon, requires success in each of the
following intermediate events (IE), as illustrated in the success tree of Figure 2-2:
W,
Weapon is
Employed
Successfully
M, E, D, F, U,
Weapon Material Usable Weapon Fissile Weapon Weapon is Weapon is
Is Created Material is Material is Fabricated Tested/Used
Extracted From Diverted
I I I its Source I
Figure 2-2: Event W-Weapon is Employed Successfully
The following symbols are utilized in this figure and others to follow:
Q is the Boolean "and" event intersection operator (also denotede)
R7 is the Boolean "or" event union operator (also denoted +)
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The occurrence of all the intermediate events is necessary for success of the
top event. The intermediate events are:
1. Event M: Creation of the weapons-useable material in a reactor/fuel cycle
system.
2. Event E: Extraction of the weapons-useable material from a reactor/fuel
cycle system.
3. Event D: Diversion of the weapons-useable material from a reactor/fuel
cycle system.
4. Event F: Fabrication of the weapons.
5. Event U: Deployment of the weapon in a usable fashion.
The probabilities of each of the intermediate events, Pr(IEi) will determine the
overall proliferation risk of the reactor/fuel cycle, Pr(W), based on the intersection of
their probabilities:
Pr(W) = Pr(M) * Pr(E) e Pr(D) * Pr(F) - Pr(U) (2-5)
Figure 2-3 illustrates this concept with a Venn diagram:
M
W
E U
D F
Figure 2-3: Venn Diagram of Top Event W, W = M - E - D * F - U
In an effective proliferation resistance system the probability of Event W
should be kept very low via the actions of safeguarders and efforts to maintain low
values of the intermediate events. The remainder of this work focuses on defining
the intermediate events, their respective basic events and the important factors
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affecting the basic event probabilities. From the use of this framework, this work
identifies areas where proliferation risk can be minimized through the evaluation of
illustrative reactor/fuel cycle concepts along specific proliferation pathways.
2.3.2 Intermediate Event and Minimal Path Set Development
The following figures develop the success trees of the intermediate events.
As mentioned earlier, each intermediate event constitutes a part of the intersection
of all five in formulating the proliferation risk of a reactor/fuel cycle. Through the
Boolean operators of the trees, knowledge of the basic event probability values of
each tree is sufficient for knowledge of that for the intermediate event. The
respective resources committed by the proliferator and safeguarder can affect the
values of the probabilities of the basic events. They can also be affected by the
magnitudes of individual reactor/fuel cycle features reflected in the proliferation
resistance metrics, per the following discussion. Typically, the values of the
intermediate event probabilities will be known subject to large uncertainties due to
epistemic inadequacies and their influences on subjective judgments within the basic
events. Consequently, the value of the top event probability will be subject to
considerable uncertainty, also requiring representation as a probability density
function. This function is obtained via the propagation of the uncertainties of the
basic events to the top event, W, via the logic of Figures 2-4 through 2-8 [2-3].
EE, ER,
Fertile Material is Fertile Material is
Extracted From Extracted From
Earth Spent Reactor Fuel
Figure 2-4: Event M-Weapon Material is Created
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E, Usable
Weapon Material
is Obtained from
Its Source
EX, Usable
Weapon Material is
Obtained From an
External Source
XI,
Material Isotopic
Concentrations
are Satisfactory
XP,
Supplier Provides
Material
CS,
Material is
Separated
Chemically
XS,
Applicable
Safeguards are
Eluded
MI,
Material Isotop
Concentration
are Satisfactor'
EU, Usable
Weapon Material is
Extracted From Its
Matrix of Origin
ES,ic Extraction
s Safeguards are
Eluded
Event E-Usable Weapon Material is Extracted From Its SourceFigure 2-5:
D,.
Fissile Weapon
Material is
Diverted
DA,
Diversion is
Attempted
DE,
Diversion
Safeguards are
Eluded
SF,
Diversion Occurs
at Storage
Facility
Figure 2-6: Event
T,
Diversion Occurs
During Transport
D-Fissile Weapon
PF,
Diversion Occurs
at Production
Facility
Material is Diverted
DS, FE, FR, FQ,
Design is Fabricaton Fabrication Fabricated
Adequae Facilities are Resources are Weapon Quality
Available Available is Adequate
Figure 2-7: Event F-Weapon is Fabricated
Figure 2-8: Event
WF, WY,
Weapon Weapon Yield is
Successfully Satisfactory
Ignites
U-Weapon is Used/Tested
The MPS of Figures 2-4 through 2-8 constitute the sets of events where
success of all events in the set is necessary for success of the respective top event
of the figure. These sets are listed in Table 2-1:
Table 2-1: Minimal Path Sets of Success Trees of Top Event W
Intermediate
Event
M
Minimal Path Set
Members
(EE, 1) (ER, 1) (0, ME)
E (CS,
(CS,
D (DE,
ES,
ES,
SF)
11) (XP, Xl, XS)
EA, EN, RM)
(DE, PF) (DE, T)
F (DS, FE, FR, FQ)
U (DP, Fl, WF, WY)
Event Definitions
Weapon Material is Created
EE, I, ER, 0, ME
Usable Weapon Material is Extracted
From Its Source
CS, ES, II, XP, Xl, XS, EA, EN, RM
Fissile Weapon Material is Diverted
DE, SF, PF, T
Weapon is Fabricated
DS, FE, FR, FQ
Weapon is Used/Tested
DP, Fl, WF, WY
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Figure
2-4
2-5
2-6
2-7
2-8
As stated earlier, failure of all the MPS is necessary for failure of the
intermediate event. Thus for component events of similar probability, intermediate
events having few minimal path sets and minimal path sets having many members
will be the easiest to defeat. The intermediate events of Table 2-1 satisfying these
conditions best are Events F and U, both of which contain only one minimal path set
and are post-diversion. The proliferation resistance attributes of a reactor/fuel cycle
concept are most concerned with pre-diversion, Events M, E and D. Of these,
Events E and D satisfy the above conditions best, where failure of basic event CS is
sufficient for failure of the intermediate event E, and failure of basic event DE is
sufficient for failure of intermediate event D. This logic will be explored in more
detail in Section 2.4 in searching for vulnerabilities in the entire success tree.
The probabilities of each intermediate event can be determined by assuming
intermediate events M, E, D, F and U are mutually exclusive (a plausible
approximation) [2-4]. Equation 2-5 shows that the intersection of the probabilities of
the intermediate events forms the probability of the top event. The MPS of each
intermediate event determines its probability via Equation 2-6:
Pr(IEi) = Pr(MPS + MPSi 2 + .... + MPSiJ) (2-6)
where: lEi = the i-th intermediate event, and,
MPSi; = the j-th MPS of event IEi, where MPSiJ is defined as a minimal set of
basic events sufficient for occurrence of IEi (i.e., success of each basic
event of the MPS must occur in order for event lEi to occur via that MPS).
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2.3.3 Basic Event Definitions
The basic events that represent each intermediate event MPS and the factors
affecting their probabilities are summarized in Table 2-2:
Table 2-2: Basic Events and Factors Affecting Probability
Definition
Weapon Material
is Created
Basic
Events
EE
ER
ME
0
Important Factors
Affecting Basic Event Probability
A1, RD2
A, RD
RD
RD
A, RD
Usable Weapon
Material is
Extracted From
Its Source
CS
EA
EN
ES
11
RM
RD, H3, R4
RD
RD
A, RD, H, Qextract (Eextract,
RD, Pr(Y/Yo < X)6
RD
Xl RD, Pr(Y/Y 0 < x)
XP RD
XS RD, Qexternal (Eexternal, Gexternal)
DE RD, H
D Fissile Weapon SF RD, Qstorage (Estorage, Gstorage)Material is PF RD, Qproduction (Eproduction, Gproduction)
Diverted T RD, H, Qtransport (Etransport, Gtransport)
DS RD, Pr(Y/Yo < x)
F Weapon is FE A, RD, Qfabrication (Efabrication, Gfabrication)
Fabricated FR RD, Qdiversion (Ediversion, Gdiversion)
FQ A, RD, Qfabrication (Efabrication, Gfabrication)
DP A, RD, Quse (Euse, Guse)
WUsed/eap i FI RD, Pr(Y/Yo < x), Quse (Euse, Guse)
WF RD, Pr(Y/Yo < x)
WY Pr(Y/Yo < x)
Inter.
Event
Gextract)5
..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
1-A = Material Attractiveness (Equation 2-9)
2-RD = Resources Devoted (Expressed monetarily)
3-H = Material Shielding/Transport Difficulty (Equation 2-14)
4-R = Relative Cost Ratio (Equation 2-12)
5-Q(E,G)i = Success Probability of Defeating the i-th barrier (Equation 2-16)
6 Pr(Y/Yo < x) = Probability of Less than x% of the nominal yield (Equation 2-11)
Each intermediate event can also be treated as a separate top event, with its
probability being based on the logic of the success tree defining it and the evaluation
of Equation 2-6. Each MPS of the intermediate event contributes to the overall
intermediate event probability by use of this relationship and the basic event
probabilities. The important factors affecting the basic event probabilities will be
discussed in Section 2.3.4.
Event M-weapon material is created, is concerned with creation at a reactor,
Event CR, or an enrichment plant, Event CE, of material potentially usable in a
weapon. Event M consists of three MPS. The first MPS consists of two basic
events, Event EE-fertile material is extracted from Earth, and Event I-extracted
fertile material is irradiated in a reactor, deals with a dedicated power reactor utilizing
low-burn up with short irradiation times to create the weapons-useable material. The
second MPS also consists of two basic events, Event ER-fertile material is
extracted from spent reactor fuel, and Event 1, details the acquisition of fertile
material from the spent fuel of nuclear power reactors as part of a civilian nuclear
power system. The third MPS with two basic events, Event O-weapon material is
extracted from the Earth, and Event ME-weapon material is enriched successfully,
details the enrichment of 235U from its usual 0.7% found in nature to a level needed
for use in a weapon through a variety of enrichment technologies.
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Event E-usable weapon material is extracted from its source, is concerned
with receipt of, or chemical extraction and evasion of extraction safeguards of
weapon material (created in event M and subsequently enriched if necessary). Event
E also has three MPS. The first MPS consists of three basic events, Event CS-
material is separated chemically, Event ES-extraction safeguards are eluded, and
Event Il-created material isotopic concentrations are satisfactory. This MPS deals
with the successfully extraction of chemically separated weapons-useable material
with satisfactory isotopic concentrations of fissile material (i.e., chemical extraction of
Pu from reactor spent fuel). The second MPS consists of three basic events also,
Event XP-supplier provides material, Event XI-material isotopic concentrations are
satisfactory and Event XS-applicable safeguards are eluded. This MPS could
conceivably be one of the most preferred pathways of extraction of weapons-useable
material as it deals with either stealing the material from stockpiles or purchasing the
material on a black market. Even though this MPS is not depending upon the
features of a particular reactor/fuel cycle it is included in the analysis because it is an
overall contributor to proliferation, and if particularly attractive, may render
proliferation from domestic facilities less likely [2-5]. The third MPS has five basic
events, Event CS, Event ES, Event EA-enrichment facilities are available, Event
EN-enrichment resources are available, and Event RM-recycled materials are
enriched. This MPS details the extraction of weapons-useable material from an
enrichment facility as part of the commercial enrichment process for power reactor
fuel.
Event D-fissile weapon material is diverted, is concerned with whether
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diversion is attempted (event DA) and successful (event DS). It can occur either
before or after event E. It is concerned with fissile material diversion because such
materials are essential for creation of a nuclear weapon, and are of primary interest
to a party acquiring a nuclear weapon capability. Event D has three MPS each with
two basic events. The first MPS consists of Event DE-diversion safeguards are
eluded, and Event SF-diversion occurs at a storage facility. This MPS deals with
the successful diversion of weapons-useable material from any point in the
reactor/fuel cycle where material of use could conceivably be diverted (i.e., on-site
spent fuel storage facility, underground repository). The second MPS consists of
Event DE, and Event PF-diversion occurs at production facility. This MPS details
the successful diversion of weapons-useable material from a vulnerable point in the
production of either reactor fuel or reprocessed fuel. The third MPS consists of
Event DE, and Event T-diversion during transport. This MPS accounts for the
successful diversion of weapons-useable material at various points of the fuel cycle
involving transportation.
Event F-weapon is fabricated, is concerned with whether the weapon is
constructed successfully. Event F has only one MPS consisting of Event DS-design
is adequate, Event FE-fabrication facilities are available, Event FR-fabrication
resources are available, and Event FQ-fabricated weapon quality is adequate. This
MPS accounts for all the events needed for successful assembly of a working nuclear
weapon. This event can also partially occur during the conduct of events M, E and D
with completion based on the receipt of a given amount of fissile material in the
correct chemical form and isotopic concentrations. The probability of Event F
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depends upon the nature of the reactor/fuel cycle via its dependence upon the
probability of the quality of the weapon in the sense that this reflects the difficulty of
creating an adequate design. For example, a 239Pu-based weapon requires a design
that is quicker acting and more complex (e.g., an implosion-type) than the gun-type
design that is adequate for a 235U-based weapon. From that perspective, materials
permitting simpler, more primitive designs are move attractive to a proliferator; in
which case a proliferation prevention focus upon plutonium based weapons may be
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misplaced. In this view, U enrichment may be the most attractive proliferation
pathway, especially if more efficient, lower cost enrichment technologies become
available [2-6].
Event U-weapon is used/tested, is concerned with whether a fabricated weapon
will be successfully used or tested in an attempt to attain a political or military goal.
Event U has only one MPS also. This MPS consists of Event DP-weapon is
deployed, Event Fl-weapon is fired, Event WF-weapon ignites successfully
(concerned with successful electro/chemical functioning) and Event WY-weapon
yield is satisfactory.
Notably, Events F and U each consist of a single four-event MPS. Thus, a failure
outcome of any of these eight events is sufficient for preventing Event W. By contrast,
Events M, E and D each have at least two redundant MPS, implying greater potentials
for proliferation success.
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2.3.4 Factors Affecting Basic Event Probability
The following discussion defines the important factors that affect each basic
event probability. The analytical method presented here is static, integrating the
effects of proliferation factors upon the ultimate outcome, Event W. Some of the
interactions treated are actually dynamic and time dependent. They must be treated
through a combination of careful event definitions, such that the particular time-
dependent event evolution of interest is included in the relevant event definitions and
probability quantification, by integrating over different time-scales. (e.g., value of the
joint probability of material theft, theft detection and material retrieval must consider
the range of combinations of applicable time scales for these individual events)
They must also note the effects upon probability quantification of the context of the
situation being analyzed (e.g., contrasting a proliferator having or lacking an
indigenous nuclear power enterprise) [2-7].
In evaluating the probabilities of the events participating in Event W, the
perspective is toward the future in assessing the likelihood of occurrence of Event
W, when uncertainty exists concerning it outcome. For a known proliferator the
probability of Event W is equal to unity. For a covert proliferator the probability of
Event W may be evaluated at a high value if the proliferator is highly competent and
has provided some evidence of success in the intermediate events of Event W (e.g.,
Israel). Conversely, an attempt to proliferation may be made overtly but without
apparent success leading to evaluation of a low value of the probability of Event W
(e.g., the apparent 1999 failure of Pakistan to detonate some weapons successfully
in well-publicized tests). The later events in the proliferation sequence F, D and U
depend strongly on both the actual and perceived levels of competition between
proliferator and safeguarder as will be explained. This suggests that reliance upon
safeguards and creating the perception with the proliferator that the deployed
safeguards are likely to be effective can be an important portion of a successful anti-
proliferation strategy in Events F and U. Similarly, reactor/fuel cycle technical
features affect the probabilities of all of the intermediate events, M, E and D,
indicating their value in deterring proliferation in these events.
As is shown in Table 2-2, the probabilities of the basic events are affected by
several important factors. These factors are, A-the material attractiveness, RD-
the resources devoted, H-the material shielding/transport difficulty, R-the relative
cost ratio, Q(E,G)i-the success probability of defeating the i-th barrier, and Pr(Y/Yo
< x)-the probability of less than x% of the nominal yield (with "x" defined in this
work as not exceeding 5% of the expected, or nominal yield). A logical requirement
in order for these factors to have validity is for their values to affect the probabilities
of the basic events.
The factors affecting the basic event probabilities do so in two differing
fashions. The first method is to treat each one of the factors as separate conditional
probabilities and then use the intersection of those factors to determine the basic
event probability. This method affects every basic event probability listed. The
probability of the i-th basic event, BEi, is affected by factor XXj where j is the number
of factors affecting each basic event. Therefore, the probability of the i-th basic
event BEi, can be defined as:
Pr(BE)i = Pr(BE I XX1)i * Pr(BE I XX 2 )i * ... * Pr(BE I XX;)i (2-7)
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The second method involves the use of a modulating function and affects the
probabilities of Events EE, ER, 0, ES, FE, FR and DP separately from those basic
events calculated by Equation 2-7. The modulating function is defined as Z(A') and
is dependent on the material attractiveness of the i-th reactor/fuel cycle as compared
to the reference PWR in Section 4.2.1. The probability of i-th basic event, BEi, is
calculated as follows:
P(BE)i = P(BE I XXj)i * Z(A') (2-8)
where:
P(BE I XX)i = the conditional probability of the i-th basic event given important
factors XXj, and
Z(A') = the material attractiveness modulating function, with A' = Ai/Apwr.
A form of Z(A') is shown in Figure 2-9 for illustrative purposes.
1 -
Z(A')
A' 10
Figure 2-9: Material Attractiveness Modulating Function
The following discussion defines these factors and relates them to the basic
events.
Material Attractiveness, A: This factor is an overall measure of the
attractiveness of a reactor/fuel cycle concept as a producer of the material of
interest. In order for any reactor/fuel cycle to be attractive to a potential proliferator,
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it should be able to produce abundant weapons-useable materials. The factors
affecting how attractive is such production include the following: the bare fast-
neutron based critical mass of the material, the difficulty of utilizing the material in a
weapon, and the relative cost of extracting the needed material (i.e., a particular
isotopic composition) from its matrix of origin. Therefore, the material attractiveness,
A is defined as:
A= N (2-9)
Pr(Y/Yo <5%) * R
where:
N = critical mass production rate [# of CM / reactor year]
Pr(Y/Yo < 5%) = probability of less than 5% of the nominal yield
R = relative cost ratio
Resources Devoted, RD: This factor affects every basic event probability
except for Event WY. In determining how the resources devoted affects the basic
event probability, it is reasonable to treat each of these probabilities as products of
separate respective functions of the resources devoted, RD, to the success of each
basic event. The probability of each basic event is therefore affected by the
resourced devoted using the conditional probability method described in Equation 2-
7. The resources devoted, RD, is one of j factors affecting the overall basic event
probability. The conditional probabilities associated with each event will be functions
of the material pathways sought, the sophistication of the weapon sought, the efforts
of the safeguarders and the economic situation of the proliferator.
Critical Mass Production Rate, N: The rate of production of critical masses,
N, is of central interest, as it provides a measure of the number of potential weapons
that could be ultimately produced by a facility. This rate, N, equals the number of
critical masses of material of interest produced annually by the reactor, taking into
account its planned refueling practices (we assume that any scheme of interest
would focus upon reprocessing, or chemical extraction of uranium and plutonium
using the isotopic mix produced by the reactor). The rate, N, is defined as:
N = Annual Production Rate of Material of Interest [kg/yr] (2-10)
Weight of Critical Mass [kg/CM]
Should isotopic enrichment technologies become much less expensive than
they are currently, the option of isotopic separation might become of practical
interest in civilian reactor/fuel cycle-based nuclear weapons proliferation.
Probability of Less than 5% of the Nominal Yield, Pr(Y/Y0 < 5%): The
difficulty of constructing an effective weapon using the material of interest is
intended to reflect the resource demands needed in order for the material obtained
from the reactor to actually be useful as a weapon. This factor focuses upon the
difficulty of creating a highly multiplying assembly, especially upon the probability of
a nuclear weapon composed of the material of interest failing to detonate as
intended, due to starting the fission chain reaction early during the interval of
increasing supercriticality. Neutrons released by spontaneous fission cause pre-
initiation, the start of the explosion before the weapon has reached its highest
supercriticality value, which in turn causes a reduction of the device's yield. The
smallest value of the explosive yield results from preinitiation, which occurs at the
same moment that the weapon becomes critical. This factor is a measure of the
adequacy of the design yield of the weapon. The designers of the weapon will have
a specific design, or nominal yield, Yo in mind. This relationship is a special case of
the cumulative probability that the device's actual detonation yield, Y, will be less
than a certain fraction of the nominal value, Yo. This probability is defined as [2-8]:
Pr( < x) =1 e[(-0.5*N*t * x667 )+(45*N*T] (2-11)
YO
where:
N = neutron production rate from spontaneous fission [# neutrons / second]
to= time to maximum criticality [seconds]
(to = 1 x 10-5 sec for implosion-type devices) [2-9]
x = fraction of nominal yield exceeded
= mean time between neutron generations [seconds]
(r= 1 x 108 sec for implosion-type devices) [2-10]
The basic idea behind using this probability as a measure of difficulty is that
a nation trying to develop a nuclear weapon capability would prefer to use the least
sophisticated technology necessary as a means of reducing this value. If they were
required by their material choices to use more demanding techniques doing this
would impose an unwelcome associated expense.
Relative Cost Ratio, R: This factor measures the relative difficulty of
extracting the needed material (i.e., a particular isotopic composition) from its matrix
of origin as compared to the difficulty of extracting the same amount of material from
a referenced base pressurized water reactor (PWR) described in Section 4.2.1. The
relative cost ratio, Ri is defined for the i-th reactor/fuel cycle as:
Ri = Cf + Coi (2-12)
Co-i
where:
Cf-i = the marginal cost ratio of obtaining the material of interest from the
annual spent fuel from the reactor based on the decay heat and level of
radioactivity as measures of cost incursions, and
Co = the total post-reactor cost of processing and disposing of the spent fuel
produced annually by the reactor.
The marginal cost ratio, Cf is defined as:
C = 'DH * SF' (2-13)DHpwr SFpwr
where:
DHi = decay heat of a CM of material of interest from the i-th reactor/fuel cycle
[Watts / CM]
SFi = spontaneous neutron emission of material of interest from the i-th
reactor/fuel cycle [# neutrons / second]
Material Shielding/Transport Difficulty, H: For purposes of evaluating the
difficulty of shielding (and transporting) the materials we focus upon the structural
requirements imposed by the need for radiation shielding. The reason for this choice
is that the need for massive shielding imposes both costs and (more importantly) an
inconvenience in handling the material of interest clandestinely thereby rendering it
easier to detect diversion. The material shielding/transport difficulty, Hi, is defined for
the i-th reactor/fuel cycle as:
H= 'SF (2-14)SFpwr
where:
SFi = spontaneous neutron emission of material of interest from the i-th
reactor/fuel cycle [# neutrons / second]
Success Probability of Defeating the i-th Barrier, Q(EG)i: The following
discussion outlines the method for estimation of the dependence the success
probability of a barrier upon the mutual levels of effort (measured in monetary terms)
of a would-be nuclear weapons proliferator operating in competition with an
safeguarder (anti-proliferator), who is trying to defeat him. For some sorts of barriers
(e.g., material and some technical barriers) the effects of this competition may be
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slight or even non-existent, and for others, especially institutional barriers, they can
be large. The full range of possibilities can be accommodated by the method
outlined below.
Consider the following events concerning the success of a proliferation
barrier:
B = the barrier is successful
B = the barrier is not successful (the complementary event of B)
e = the level of effort of the safeguarder is equal to E (measured monetarily)
g = the level of effort of the proliferator is equal to G (measured monetarily)
P(E,G)i = failure probability of defeating the i-th barrier = Pr(B)
Q(E,G), = success probability of defeating the i-th barrier = Pr(B3
We note that these values will depend upon the values of E and G; thus, they
are conditional probabilities. As the value of E increases that of P decreases;
similarly as the value of G increases that of Q decreases. However, by conservation
of probability we can say for all possible combinations of E and G that
P(E,G) + Q(E,G) = 1 (2-15)
Therefore, we can define the success probability of defeating the i-th barrier as:
Q(E,G)i = 1 - P(E,G)i (2-16)
As an illustrative example, consider the diversion of the material of interest
during storage. As with the measures discussed above, concerning diversion we
focus upon the difficulty of achieving it successfully. A more difficult to divert nuclear
concept is a more proliferation resistant concept. A measure of the difficulty of
diversion is the expense, E, devoted to diverting a critical mass of the material of
interest should it be available for potential diversion (a condition concerning most
power reactors that arises in practice only with closed fuel cycles).
Since diversion is the result of a competition between the potential diverter and
the party trying to safeguard the material of interest (the safeguarder), with each
taking what he hopes will be adequate measures for his success, it follows that
neither party can be assured of success regardless of his level of effort (we use here
the expense incurred to quantify that effort). From these considerations we can
obtain the cumulative success probability function of defeating the diversion barrier,
Q(E,G)storage, where E and G are the expenditures by the would-be diverter and
safeguarder, respectively.
The resistance of a nuclear concept to diversion can be measured by the
value of Q(E,G)storage at a stated level of expenditure, or alternatively one can
compare the respective values of E for different nuclear concepts at a stated
confidence level. Nuclear concepts having higher E values for the same values of
Q(E,G)storage and G are the more diversion-resistant ones. For a particular
reactor/fuel cycle nuclear concept the functional form of Q(E,G)storage will depend
upon its values of H, R and the extrinsic safeguards (e.g., means of inspection, audit
and sample interrogation) that can be used to verify that the mass of a sample of the
material of interest is at least as great as its intended value (a safeguarder's success
criterion). The latter activities are intended to provide information that can permit an
observer to state that the mass of material of interest present satisfies the success
criterion at some level of confidence. When that level of confidence exceeds an
acceptable threshold value, the success criterion can be said to be satisfied. As the
value of H and R increase that of Q(E,G)storage will decrease, as diversion will
become more difficult and have lower success probability.
The actual functional form of Q(E,G)i will also depend upon the efforts of the
safeguarder (indicated by his level of expenditures). For purposes of this work, to
illustrate the concepts involved, we treat both levels of expenditure, E and G, as
being constant. In reality, the potential diverter will not know the magnitude of such
expenditures, and the uncertainty of this knowledge may have a proliferation
deterrent effect. In this situation, the proliferator will know the value of his own
expenditures, but can only guess at that of his opponent. The same holds true for the
safeguarder and his level of expenditures and what his guess is as to those of would
be proliferators.
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2.4 Reactor/Fuel Cycle Vulnerability and Resistance Metrics
The degree to which the i-th reactor/fuel cycle is vulnerable to proliferation is
indicated by the value of Pr(Wi), and its vulnerability relative to a reference
reactor/fuel cycle is indicated by the ratio, R1 i-proliferation vulnerability, where:
R1i Pr(W ) (2-17)Pr(WO)
where:
Pr(Wi) = the top event probability of the i-th reactor/fuel cycle
Pr(Wo) = the top event probability of the reference PWR
In formulating a measure of reactor/fuel cycle proliferation resistance, we wish
to obtain an understanding of the degree to which reactor/fuel cycle features
contribute to prevention of proliferation success. One such measure is provided by
the share in the probability of event W to which such features contribute. We can
state the following relationships:
Pr(W) << 1 for an effective anti-proliferation strategy,
Pr(W) = Pr(M * E * D * F * U), as illustrated in Figure 2-3, and therefore,
Pr(W) = Pr(M) * Pr(E) * Pr(D) * Pr(F) * Pr(U) (2-18)
When intermediate events, M, E, D, F and U are mutually independent, as
stated earlier, they follow the following plausible approximation,
Prob.(IEi) = Prob.(MPSi1 + MPSi 2 + ... + MPSij), (2-19)
where:
lEi = the i-th intermediate event and MPSij is the j-th minimal path set (MPS) of
event lEi, and
MPSij = the minimal set of basic events sufficient for occurrence of lEi (i.e.,
success of each basic event of the MPS must occur in order for event
lEi to occur via that MPS).
The contribution of reactor/fuel cycle basic event k to the probability of IEi is
given by the ratio, lik, and defined as:
Prob.(MPSj, +MPS2
Prob.(IEi)
+A +MPSu
- (2-20)
where:
MPSijk = an MPS containing a basic event, the probability of which is affected
by the k-th reactor/ fuel cycle feature.
The overall measure of the proliferation resistance of a reactor/fuel cycle is
provided by
= Pr(W')
'PR 
=Pr(W)
W'=[M'* E'* D'* F'* U'], and
1E, = [MPS'3 + MPS'2 +A + MPSj]
(2-21)
(2-22)
(2-23)
and where:
MPS'= an MPS containing a reactor/fuel cycle-dependent basic event and
the element of the MPS' sequence from j=1 through J each
containing at least one such basic event, and the sequence j=1, ..., J
includes all such MPSs for lEi. This information is analogous to that
of the Fussell-Vesely risk importance measure encountered in risk
analyses.
From Equations 2-20 and 2-21, it is seen that the magnitudes of lik and IPR
both depend upon the overall anti-proliferation context of the entire proliferation
prevention program in which the reactor/fuel cycle of interest is involved.
lik =
where:
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In comparison of alternative reactor/fuel cycles (designated as concepts I and
m), one wishes to examine their relative contributions to IPR, as provided by the
ratio, R2-proliferation resistance, defined as:
R2 = F 1 Prob.(W{) (2-24)
I'PR-m I Prob.(Wn)(-
where:
IPR-1 or m = the proliferation resistance importance of concept I or m based
on the technical attributes of the reactor/fuel cycle: A,
Pr(Y/Yo<x), H, and R.
A reactor/fuel cycle concept having low proliferation vulnerability and high
proliferation resistance will display a low value of R1 and a high value of R2 [2-11].
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Chapter 3: Proliferation Pathways
3.1 Overview
According to the methodology presented here, the ability to successfully
employ a nuclear weapon requires success in all five of the intermediate events, M,
E, D, F and U. Success in the latter two intermediate events, F and U, requires
completion of a non-optional set of processes (one MPS for each intermediate
event) needed to fabricate the weapon and use it in a manner deemed necessary.
However, the first three intermediate events, M, E and D, offer a potential proliferator
many pathways for acquiring the fissile material needed for a nuclear weapon.
These include diversion of weapons-useable material from a civilian nuclear power
facility (either once through or closed fuel cycle), indigenous production of the
material in an open or clandestine facility, purchase or theft. No matter which
pathway is chosen, the initial decision must include the type of weapons-useable
material the nation will focus its efforts on, either the uranium or plutonium. Each
one of these pathways involves many complex systems and must either be
undertaken secretly while under the scrutiny of IAEA inspectors for NPT non-nuclear
weapon states or be done openly by non-NPT member states (such as Israel, India
and Pakistan).
In making the decision to develop a nuclear weapons program or acquire
nuclear weapons, a nation or subnational group must make a choice about these
options. In theory, the nation will choose a pathway(s) that ensures the greatest
chance of proliferation success at the lowest risk of either detection or response
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from the international community. Many factors affect which pathway a potential
proliferator will seek.
All nuclear weapon states have developed their capability to successfully
employ a nuclear weapon through a dedicated program designed specifically for that
purpose [3-1]. However, and as mentioned earlier, the continued development and
interest in civilian nuclear power offers potential starting points for those nations not
currently in possession of nuclear weapons and wishing to have them. The
international trade of high technology systems capable of conducting research and
development offers potential clandestine operation of enrichment or separation
facilities. Figure 3-1 details the many pathways for production of a nuclear weapon
using a civilian nuclear power system and clandestine facilities [3-2].
EFE SPENT FUELL
LWR SFSTOENTF PACKAGING REPFIORY
LEU -- ----
- - - - - - - - - - - -- *r NUCLEAR---WEAPONS
URANIUM -------------------------------- ----- -CLA ND ESTI NE:
FUEL REPROCESSIN(
PLANT PLANT
C-- LANETINE-
IENRICHMENT REPROCESSIN PLUTONIUM.
PLANT PLANT STORAGE
---- Na-r----MNUCLEAR-WEAPONS
E - --- - ------ ---- -- - ----------------------- P D
MOX FUEL
FABRICATION
PLANT
:SEPARATION
Legend:| PLANT
NU - Natural U MOX - Mixed Oxide Fuel
LEU - Low Enriched U Pu -Plutonium
HEU - Highly Enriched U (P)SF - (Packaged) Spent Fuel
SEU - Slightly Enriched U - Fuel Cycle Flow
--- Diversion Pathway
Figure 3-1: Pathways for a Proliferator Using Civilian Nuclear Power
The intentional or inadvertent "leakage" of materials or actual weapons also
offers future potential. This option has become an increasing concern with the
fragmentation of the former Soviet Union, and the uncertainties in the disposition of
weapons and weapons-useable material in many newly autonomous states as well
as in Russia itself.
The trade-offs and decision processes involving the costs and benefits of
choosing one of these pathways over another can best be assessed through an
overview of each of these areas in the context of the success tree developed in
Chapter 2. The pathway of diversion of weapons-useable Pu from spent fuel in a
storage facility is examined here in detail, with a full assessment of the proliferation
success being calculated in Chapters 4 and 5 for each of four different reactor types.
Although all the pathways to proliferation success are not analyzed in this
work, they are presented as areas needing further research to better understand the
complexity of the proliferation problem and its affect on civilian nuclear power.
3.2 Pathways Developed Here
3.2.1 Once-through (Open Cycle) with Diversion from Spent Fuel
The diversion of weapons-useable 239 Pu from the spent fuel in a storage
facility of a reactor operating on a once-through fuel cycle is examined according to
the methodology developed in Chapter 2. This is only one of many pathways that
exist for a potential proliferator when examining typical fuel cycles or a clandestine
operation involving the enrichment of 235U or the diversion and chemical separation
of 239 Pu. This particular pathway follows the success tree methodology through the
following minimal path set of Events (ER, I, CS, ES, 11, DE, SF, DS, FE, FR, FQ, DP,
Fl, WF, WY).
More specifically, weapons-useable material is created, Event M, is achieved
through the success of Events ER and I. Within this pathway, the fertile material is
irradiated in a reactor, Event I, and then subsequently extracted from the spent
reactor fuel, Event ER. Success in Event E is achieved through the chemical
separation of the material, Event CS, into a chemical form requiring no further
reprocessing in that the weapons-useable material's isotopic concentrations are
satisfactory for use in a nuclear weapon, Event II. Finally, Event E is successful
when the extraction safeguards are eluded (i.e., operation of the separation facility),
Event ES. The successful diversion of the fissile weapon material, Event D, is
achieved through the successful diversion of the weapons-useable material at the
storage facility, Event SF, and the successful elusion of the safeguards, Event DE.
Although it could be possible to divert the spent fuel while in transit, Event T, or while
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being processed, Event PF, for packaging and final disposal, these basic events are
not considered in this analysis.
The remaining two intermediate events, Events, F and U will apply in all the
pathways being considered and are not developed further as part of these pathways.
They will, however, be included in the quantitative analysis of Chapter 4 in
determining the overall proliferation risk of the reactor/fuel cycle options being
considered.
3.3 Pathways Needing Further Development
Although all pathways to successful employment of nuclear weapons are not
fully developed here as part of the illustrative example, they are important for
mention due to their affect on the ones being further analyzed. These pathways are
important for future work, as the problem of nuclear weapons proliferation has been
brought to the forefront in latest world events. To many, the IAEA safeguards have
fundamental limitations. One of the most relevant is that several suspect
proliferators are not signatories to the NPT and are therefore not obligated to provide
any evidence of a nuclear weapons program of succumb to any international
safeguard inspections. Therefore, the IAEA has little ability to forestall the
development of nuclear weapons in states that are not NPT members, and only a
limited ability in NPT member states that are able to develop a secret infrastructure
that lies outside IAES safeguards [3-3].
3.3.1 Reprocessing (Closed) with Diversion from Various Points
As has been shown in Figure 3-1, many pathways exist for the diversion of
weapons-useable material from a civilian nuclear power system, be it in the form of
235U or 239Pu and in an open or clandestine atmosphere. The methodology outlined
in Chapter 2 lists several MPS that involve the events commonplace in reprocessed
fuel cycles. They are developed here as pathways for acquisition of weapons-
useable material.
The initial creation of the weapons usable material, Event M, must be
accomplished through Events ER and I as mentioned earlier. As part of normal
operations of the closed fuel cycle, the weapons-useable material would then be
sent to a working reprocessing facility. In order to achieve success in extracting the
material, Event E, the following events must be successful, Events CS, ES, EA, EN
and RM (for further enrichment of the uranium), or the Events CS, ES, and 11 (where
weapons-useable material concentrations are suitable in advance). The further
enrichment of weapons-useable material from the spent fuel, Event RM, is
predicated on the notion that the enrichment facilities and resources are available,
Events ES and EA. Without these resources, this option would not even be
possible. Gaining ultimate success of Event E further requires that the weapons-
useable material be extracted through the chemical separation of the various
materials in the spent fuel, Event CS and successful eluding of extraction
safeguards, Event ES.
Except for a few countries with unsafeguarded reprocessing facilities (Israel,
India and possibly North Korea) [3-4], obtaining Pu for weapon purposes would
require its diversion at a foreign reprocessing facility and subsequent illegal transfer
to the target country or diversions from safeguards within the country itself. Both
avenues are highly risky and perhaps very costly if tried in a clandestine fashion, but
they do remain a possibility.
3.3.2 Dedicated Reactor for Plutonium Production
This method of success in employing nuclear weapons has been the
preferred method of those nations that currently possess nuclear weapons [3-5].
The key step in pursuing this Pu pathway is by irradiating uranium in a dedicated
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plutonium production reactor at low burn-up. Rather than choose to divert fuel from
a safeguarded reactor, as in the earlier case, the proliferator would extract the fertile
material from the Earth, Event EE and irradiate it in a dedicated facility, Event I.
Once irradiated, the weapons-useable material would have to be successfully
extracted, Event E, from the spent fuel. This would happen in much the same
manner as those described earlier through Events CS, ES, and II, where the
weapons-useable material concentrations are suitable in advance, thus requiring no
further enrichment. Diversion of weapons-useable material, Event D, could
successfully be accomplished at many points within this pathway. Given success of
eluding the safeguards, Event DE, the material of interest could be diverted at a
storage facility, Event SF, or during transport of the material, Event T.
This pathway could also be used to divert weapons-useable material from
research reactors or critical assemblies. Approximately 180 of these facilities are
currently in operation worldwide [3-6]. Research reactors are widely used for
scientific investigations and various applications. There are several points at which
diversion of weapons-useable material could occur. As mentioned earlier, the
diversion of fresh or slightly irradiated fuel for clandestine chemical extraction, Event
CS, is one possibility. Others include the diversion of spent fuel or extensively
irradiated fuel for clandestine chemical extraction, Event CS. The possibility does
exist for clandestine production of Pu or 233U through irradiation of undeclared
weapons-useable material in research reactors. As the level of neutron flux
increases, so does the ability to produce substantial quantities of Pu or 233U. This
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could be achieved, for example, by placing target materials in irradiation positions in
or near the core, or by replacing reflector elements by fertile material targets [3-7].
3.3.3 Dedicated Enrichment Facilities
The use of a dedicated enrichment facility to produce weapons-useable
uranium is strongly dependent upon the proliferator's technical infrastructure,
nuclear physics expertise and access to foreign technical assistance. Most of the
sensitive technologies and components used for uranium enrichment fall under very
strict export controls, and are therefore very difficult to obtain in the open market. To
successfully obtain weapons-useable material from a dedicated enrichment facility a
proliferator would have to extract weapon-useable material from the Earth, Event 0
and enrich it successfully, Event ME. The extraction of the material from its source,
the natural uranium would be accomplished through the successful execution of
Events, CS ES, EA, EN and RM as previously mentioned. There are numerous
enrichment technologies available for use, however, gaseous diffusion and gas
centrifuge have dominated efforts by the five declared nuclear states as the methods
of choice [3-8]. The proliferation potential demonstrated by Iraq has shown that
nations continue to try to develop nuclear weapons through these enrichment
methods. Successful diversion of the weapons-useable material, Event D, through
Events, SF, PF or T allows the proliferator access to these materials. As with the
case of the other pathways, successfully employing a nuclear weapon is then reliant
on successful completion of Events F and U.
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Chapter 4: Assessment of Reactor/Fuel Cycle Concepts
4.1 Overview
An illustrative example is presented in order to demonstrate the methodology
outlined in Chapter 2 through a comparative quantitative assessment. The nuclear
weapons proliferation risk of successfully employing a plutonium based implosion-
type nuclear weapon, Event W, is calculated for a pressurized water reactor (PWR),
a PWR utilizing thorium as a fertile component of the nuclear fuel (Radkowsky
Thorium Reactor-RTR) and a high temperature, gas cooled, reactor with a pebble
bed core (PBMR). This particular pathway follows the success tree methodology
through the following minimal path set of events (ER, I, CS, ES, II, DE, SF, DS, FE,
FR, FQ, DP, Fl, WF, WY).
More specifically, weapons-useable material is created, Event M, is achieved
through the success of Events ER and I. Within this pathway, the fertile material is
irradiated in a reactor, Event I, and then subsequently extracted from the spent
reactor fuel, Event ER. Success in Event E is achieved through the chemical
separation of the material, Event CS, into a chemical form requiring no further
reprocessing in that the weapons-useable material's isotopic concentrations are
satisfactory for use in a nuclear weapon, Event II. Finally, Event E is successful
when the extraction safeguards are eluded (i.e., operation of the separation facility),
Event ES. The successful diversion of the fissile weapon material, Event D, is
achieved through the successful diversion of the weapons-useable material at the
storage facility, Event SF, and the successful elusion of the safeguards, Event DE.
Although it could be possible to divert the spent fuel while in transit, Event T, or while
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being processed, Event PF, for packaging and final disposal, these basic events are
not considered in this analysis. As with the case of the other pathways, successfully
employing a nuclear weapon is then reliant on completion of Events F and U.
The PWR is considered the reference case, as it is representative of the
majority of commercial nuclear power systems in operation today. Each of the
reactor types being assessed is outlined in Section 4.2.
4.2 Reactor/Fuel Cycle Concepts Overview
4.2.1 Pressurized Water Reactor (PWR)
The reference reactor for this assessment is a pressurized water reactor,
PWR, typical of those found in most countries with commercial nuclear power
infrastructures. This reference design is a light water reactor (LWR) and uses water
as both the coolant and the moderator. Slightly enriched uranium oxide (UO2) is
fabricated into the form of short, cylindrical fuel pellets that are loaded into long
zirconium-alloy cladding tubes to produce fuel rods. These rods are then assembled
into a rectangular array forming the fuel assembly. The PWR considered in this
analysis has a power output of 3,400 megawatts-thermal [MW(th)] and an electric
power of 1,122 megawatts-electric [MW(e)], for an efficiency of 33.0 [%]. A
summary of the design specifications is included in Table 4-1 [4-1]:
Table 4-1: Design Specifications for Reference PWR
3400 [MW(th)]
........ 1122 .MW65 e
220
289
UO2
WIIMM 4.5 [%]
658 _kg
m.. Mss e.u . Asse. 523 k
it e a yrWater
The fuel management for the reference PWR is an 18-month operating cycle
with a 4-batch scheme, corresponding to one-fourth of the core being replaced
during each refueling. A burn-up of 45,000 megawatt days (thermal) per metric ton
of heavy metal [MWD(th)/MTHM] is used in the reference PWR.
The spent fuel removed every 18 months from the reactor is transported to the
on-site spent fuel storage facility. No reprocessing of the spent fuel is considered in
this analysis. The spent fuel is placed in spent fuel storage racks and the racks are
placed under water in the fuel storage building adjacent to the reactor building.
These racks hold the assemblies and maintain the required spacing between the
assemblies to provide criticality control and residual heat removal.
In this illustrative assessment, the amount of plutonium produced by the
reactor is one of the primary metrics needed for analysis. Table 4-2 summarizes the
plutonium isotopic percentages [%] and the mass of plutonium produced per year of
a PWR operating at steady state with a 45,000 [MWD(th)/MTHM] burn-up [4-2]:
Table 4-2: Plutonium Content of Spent PWR Fuel
2a~u 55.8
P25.6
10.4
24a~u6.2
[kg Puyr] 269.0
As mentioned earlier, the spent fuel is expected to be on-site in the underwater
storage tanks for the first ten years post-irradiation and then stored above ground in
dry casks on an interim basis until internment in a geologic repository.
4.2.2 PWR with Thorium-Oxide Fuel (Radkowsky Thorium Reactor-RTR)
Several nuclear reactor designs have tried to capitalize on the use of thorium,
Th, as a fuel for use in PWRs. There are, however, several problems accompanying
its use, including recycling of the material (nonproliferation concerns) and the
problem of achieving very large accumulated burn-up of the thorium in a once-
through fuel cycle. The Radkowsky Thorium Reactor (RTR) core offers a solution to
the thorium utilization problem.
The basic idea behind the RTR is to use a "seed" and "blanket" fuel assembly
where the thorium part of the fuel is separated from the uranium part of the
assembly. This separation allows differing fuel management schemes for the
thorium part of the fuel, the "blanket", and the uranium portion of the core, the
"seed". The main design criteria of the RTR core are the replacement of current fuel
assemblies in existing PWRs, and the maximum allowable fresh fuel enrichment will
be kept below 20[%] 235U. A summary of the design specifications is included in
Table 4-3 [4-3]:
Table 4-3: Design Specifications for RTR Design
hermal Power 3000 [MW(th)]
Electrical Power 990 [MW(e)]
Number of Fuel Assemblies 163
Fue Rods / F Assembi 200
Fue0 Seed) U0 2
Fuel Enrichment Seed 20.0 [%]
Fue[ (lanket) ThO2,UO2
Fuel Enrichment Blanket 17.0 [%]
oolant Water
Specifically, the RTR fuel assembly consists of two spatial regions, the
internal region-the seed, and the external region-the blanket, as seen in Figure 4-
1 [4-4].
RTR Core Outlay
Blanket
Seed
Figure 4-1: Diagram of RTR Core Outlay
The design objective of this arrangement is to maximize the power production
of the blanket region, with the seed supplying the neutrons needed. The blanket fuel
considered in this analysis was thorium oxide, ThO 2, with the addition of uranium
oxide, U02. The uranium is added to generate power in the blanket and to
"denature" the 233U bred within the blanket as indicated in Figure 1-5.
Key features of the fuel management scheme are:
. Irradiating the blanket fuel of mixed ThO 2 and UO2 for a period of 10 years
before removal.
. Employing metallic uranium-zirconium-alloy as the seed fuel and
irradiating it for 3 years.
. The standard multi-batch fuel management of the PWR is replaced by a
more complicated scheme, based on two separate fuel flow routes, seed
route and blanket route.
The discharged fuel inventory and fissile content for the RTR are summarized
in Table 4-4 [4-5]:
Table 4-4: Discharged Fuel Inventory for the RTR
1,595 1,445 49.6 12.9
2,411 - 2,072 87.0 - 24.1
2,894 - 2,385 92.4 - 31.8
3,299 - 2,732 119.9 - 38.1
3,616 - 3,003 140.6 - 42.5
3,616 - 3,018 152.8 - 42.5
3,616 - 3,059 156.6 - 43.3
3,616 - 3,021 155.6 - 43.0
3,616 - 3,023 157.9 - 43.0
3,781 32,370 3,132 171.1 635.0 36.6
3,206 323.7 2,689 128.4 63.5 48.4
The data presented in Table 4-4 show that the plutonium discharged from the
seed averaged over the blanket life is 36.6 [kg] (seed plutonium), and the plutonium
contained in the discharged blanket is 118 [kg] or 11.8 [kg/yr] (blanket plutonium).
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The isotopic composition and yearly production of this plutonium are
summarized in Table 4-5 [4-6]:
Table 4-5: Plutonium Content of Spent RTR Fuel
23"Pu 6.5 12.0
239Pu 46.5 38.2
240pU 22.5 15.0
241Pu 15.5 14.7
242Pu 9.0 20.1
k Pu/r 36.6 11.8
The plutonium contained in the discharged fuel assemblies is relatively
minimal in relation to a PWR with comparable power output. The "neutronic" quality
is also much less than what is needed for efficient recycling. Therefore, as in the
case of the reference PWR, the spent fuel assemblies, used until exhausted, are
stored on an interim basis at the reactor site until a permanent facility becomes
available.
4.2.3 Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR)
The Pebble Bed Modular Reactor (PBMR) is a member of the high
temperature gas cooled reactor (HTGR) family. The PBMR utilizes a Brayton power
cycle and consists of a core of fuel pebbles through which helium gas circulates.
The helium travels to an intermediate heat exchanger where it deposits its heat in a
secondary helium loop that then travels through the turbo-machinery creating
useable energy. The PBMR considered in this analysis has a power output of 250
[MW(th)] and an electric power of 110 [MW(e)], for an efficiency of 44 [%]. The
primary system of the PBMR is contained within a pressure vessel, much the same
as the PWR and RTR design.
A summary of the design specifications is included in Table 4-6 [4-7]:
Table 4-6: Design Specifications for the PBMR
herm P 250 [MW(th)]
etrialPower 110 [MW(e)]
ore Heigh 10.0 [m]
Core Diameter 3.0 [m]
PressureVesse Hiht 16.0 [m]
PresureVesel iamter5.6 [m]
Numbr ofFuelPebbes -360,000
Micrshee / Fue Pebble --- ..... 11,000
Fuel UO2
Fuel Pebble-D'iamte_ 60._ [mm]_
Fuel Peble richment 8.0 [%]
Uranium Massf/ F ebble 7.0 [g]
oolant Helium
Mean PowerDensi3.5 [MW/m3
Number of Control Rods 6
Number of AbsorrBall ystem 18
I
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The core of the PBMR is comprised of approximately 360,000 spherical fuel
pebbles. Each spherical fuel pebble contains approximately 11,000 individual
microspheres embedded in a graphite matrix. As seen in Figure 4-2 [4-8], each
microsphere is 0.9 millimeters [mm] in diameter. No microspheres are allowed in the
outer 5.0 [mm] of the sphere. The outer layer is a protective matrix of solid graphite.
The spherical fuel pebble is 60 [mm] in diameter. Each microsphere contains
approximately 0.7 milligrams [mg] of LEU at typically 8.0% 235U.
Fuel Pebble
Microsphere 60 mm
F- 0.9 mmn
Outer Pyrolitic Carbon -0
Silicon Carbide
Inner Pyrolitic Carbo
BufferA
Fuel
Fuel Free Zone (5.0mm)
Fuel/Graphite Matrix
Figure 4-2: Diagram of Pebble Bed Fuel
The fuel handling system of the PBMR is rather robust. The spherical fuel
pebbles funnel through the core, providing heat through fission. As stated, helium
gas is the coolant. Once a spherical fuel pebble passes through the core, it is
funneled through a fuel handling system. The fuel handling system controls the flow
and dissipation of fuel spheres throughout the reactor operation. It continuously
sorts the fuel spheres, discarding the spent and damaged fuel, and returning the
remaining fuel spheres to a properly distributed position in the core. In the first stage
of the system, the pebble is either identified as damaged, spent or re-useable. The
identification of spent versus re-usable is based on the extent of burn-up of each
pebble as measured by the gamma radiation from 137Cs. If a sphere has exceeded
its burn-up limit, it will be discarded and sent to a spent fuel pebble storage facility.
A new fuel pebble from a reservoir of fresh pebbles will replace the spent pebble.
The spheres are differentiated by the amount of remaining fuel and returned to the
top of the reactor core. During steady state operation, approximately 3,000 fuel
pebbles will circulate through the system daily. Approximately 350 fuel pebbles will
be discarded each day and replaced by fresh pebbles. Fuel pebbles will pass
through the core an average of 15 times before reaching their final burn-up of
approximately 90,000 [MWD(th)/MTHM] [4-9].
In this illustrative assessment, the amount of plutonium produced by the
reactor is of paramount interest. Table 4-7 summarizes the plutonium isotopic
percentages [%] and the annual mass of plutonium produced for a PBMR operating
at steady state with various burn-ups in [MWD(th)/MTHM] [4-10]:
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Table 4-7: Plutonium Content of Spent PBMR Fuel
0.02 0.10 0.28 0.60 1.17 2.14 3.66 5.58 7.00 7.28
23Pu 91.49 82.34 72.96 63.82 55.32 47.77 41.28 35.97 32.19 31.17
24oPu 7.91 15.23 21.56 26.48 29.62 30.70 29.59 26.93 24.38 23.67
241pU 0.56 2.13 4.47 7.19 9.80 11.67 12.24 11.53 10.52 10.22
242PU 0.02 0.20 0.73 1.90 4.08 7.73 13.23 19.98 26.98 27.66
[kg Pu/yr] 15.2 22.5 32.3 49.85 60.25 75.55 88.16 102.4 130.9 119.5
There is no reprocessing necessary for the operation of the PBMR and the
spent fuel is kept onsite until final disposition in a permanent repository facility.
4.3 Proliferation Risk Assessment for Spent Fuel Pathway
The overall proliferation risk for the PWR, the RTR-seed, the RTR-blanket and
the PBMR is calculated in this section according to the methodology presented in
Chapter 2.
Subjectivity is used in cases where technical aspects of each reactor/fuel cycle
cannot be used exclusively to determine the probabilities of basic events based on
influencing factors. The factors include the resources devoted, RD, and the success
probabilities of defeating each of the following barriers Q(E,G): extraction, storage,
diversion, fabrication, and use. Table 4-8 summarizes these values:
Table 4-8: Factors Determined Subjectively
RD 0.0 050 0.50 .50
Exrcin0.90 0.50 0.30 0.35
Soae0.10 0.10 0.05 0.10
Dvron0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
n0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
Ue0.10 0.10 0.10 n.10
The following logic was used in terms of subjectively determining these
factors. These values are based on subjective reasoning from numerous sources
and industry cited experiences and are considered a "best estimate". Further
research to determine computational algorithms or more structured deductions is
surely possible and should be explored in detail.
The probabilities associated with resources devoted, RD, were assumed to
have equal chance of success or failure. Therefore, each of the reactor/fuel cycle
basic events was influenced by the resources devoted in an equitable fashion and
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subsequently assigned a conditional probability of 0.50. This value is almost
certainly the most fluid and is highly dependent on the economic status of the
proliferator. This work focused on a given proliferator and therefore assigned equal
values to each reactor/fuel cycle.
The success probabilities of defeating each of the barriers, Q(E,G): extraction,
storage, diversion, fabrication, and use, were also subjectively evaluated and
assigned. Each one of these values, excluding the extraction and storage was the
same for each reactor/fuel cycle. The extraction success probability of the PWR
was assigned a value of 0.90 due to the widespread availability of chemical
separation technologies with minimal uncertainty of failure due to the minimal capital
requirements for these technologies. The remainder of the reactor/fuel cycles'
success probabilities were estimated based on the required handling and shielding
difficulties and the basic method of extraction based on volume of materials.
Although the decay power levels of the RTR-seed and the PBMR are very similar,
the PBMR received another success "discount" as the extremely large number of
pebbles needed would make success in extraction more difficult. The storage
success probability was assumed the same for the PWR, RTR-seed and the PBMR
at 0.10. The RTR-blanket received a lower score because the blanket is removed
only once in a ten year period giving far less opportunities for successful diversion
from a storage facility.
The fabrication, diversion and use success probabilities were assumed
equitable for each reactor/fuel cycle because the material of interest has already
been extracted and diverted from differing points in the reactor/fuel cycle methods.
Once the weapons-useable material is in the proper isotopic and chemical form, the
success probabilities for diversion of fabrication materials, fabrication and potential
use are the same regardless of the reactor/fuel cycle option being analyzed. The
success of diverting the fabrication materials was given a probability of 0.50 based
on the availability of the technology and materials needed to assemble a predictable
nuclear weapon. The subsequent value of fabrication success was given a
probability of 0.25, as the expertise and attention to detail needed for a quality
weapon are not equally guaranteed in terms of assembly. Finally, the success in
use was determined to have a probability of 0.10. This value is also very sensitive to
uncertainty, as varying degrees of motivation, both political and military, will
influence it based on the proliferator(s) involved and the nations or coalition in
opposition.
Each one of these conditional probabilities also has an uncertainty or
confidence interval associated with it. In each of these cases, the uncertainties of
each success probability were carried through the success tree evaluation in the
analysis of the top event probability as explained in Section 2.3.2.
4.3.1 Factors Affecting Basic Event Probabilities
The factors affecting the probabilities of the basic events for each reactor/fuel
cycle are summarized in Table 4-9 utilizing the methodology presented in Chapter 2.
The data used to calculate each of these factors is contained in Appendix A [4-11]
for each of the reactor/fuel cycles. The minimal path set followed for evaluation of
this proliferation pathway is (ER, I, CS, ES, 1l, DE, SF, DS, FE, FR, FQ, DP, Fl, WF,
WY).
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Table 4-9: Factors Affecting Basic Event Probabilities
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
1.00 0.10 0.02 0.16
0.90 0.69 0.42 0.35
0.97 0.97 0.97 0.79
0.39 0.51 0.69 0.75
0.90 0.50 0.30 0.35
0.10 0.10 0.05 0.10
0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25
0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
The basic event probabilities can then be calculated using Equations 2-7 and
2-8. Each basic event probability is then calculated as follows:
Pr(ER)
Pr(l)
Pr(CS)
Pr(ES)
Pr (II)
Pr(DE)
Pr(SF)
Pr(DS)
Pr(FE)
Pr(FR)
Pr(FQ)
Pr(DP)
Pr(FI)
Pr(WF) = [
Pr(WY) = [
= [Pr(ER I RD) * Z(A')]
= [Pr(l I RD) ]
= [Pr(CS I RD) * Pr (CS I H) * Pr(CS I R)]
= [Pr(ES I RD) * Pr(ES I H) * Pr(ES I Q(E,G)extract) * Z(A')]
= [ Pr(Il I RD) * Pr(Il I Pr(Y/ Yo <x))]
= [Pr(DE I RD) * Pr(DE I H) ]
= [Pr(SF I RD) * Pr(SF I Q(E,G)sorage)]
= [Pr(DS I RD) * Pr(DS I Pr(Y/Yo <x))]
= [ Pr(FE I RD) * Pr(FE I Q(E,G)fabric) * Z(A') ]
= [ Pr(FR I RD) * Pr(FR I Q(E,G)diversion) ]
= [ Pr(FQ I RD) * Pr(FQ I Q(E,G)abric) * Z(A')
= [ Pr(DP I RD) * Pr(DP I Q(E,G)use) * Z(A') ]
= [ Pr(FI I RD) * Pr(FI I Pr(Y/ Yo <x))) * Pr(FI I Q(E,G)use) ]
Pr(WF
Pr(WY
I RD) * Pr(WF I Pr(Y/Yo <x))]
I Pr(Y/ Yo <x)) ]
(4-1)
(4-2)
(4-3)
(4-4)
(4-5)(4-6)
(4-7)(4-8)
(4-9)
(4-10)
(4-11)
(4-12)
(4-13)
(4-14)
(4-15)
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Table 4-10 summarizes the basic event probabilities for each reactor/fuel cycle:
Table 4-10: Basic Event Probabilities for each Reactor/Fuel Cycle
0.5000 0.0484 0.0105 0.0801
0.5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
0.4364 0.3356 0.2037 0.1391
0.4050 0.0167 0.0013 0.0099
0.3065 0.2462 0.1151 0.1253
0.4500 0.3454 0.2090 0.1768
0.0500 0.0500 0.0250 0.0500
0.3065 0.2462 0.1551 0.1253
0.1250 0.0121 0.0026 0.0200
0.2500 0.2500 0.2500 0.2500
0.1250 0.0121 0.0026 0.0200
0.0500 0.0048 0.0010 0.0080
0.0307 0.0246 0.0155 0.0125
0.3065 0.2462 0.1551 0.1253
0.6130 0.4924 0.3101 0.2505
The values listed in Table 4-10 are considered mean values for each basic
event probability, and each basic event probability is considered as a separate
probability density function, so a sensitivity analysis can be calculated. The use of
SAPHIRE's Monte Carlo simulation, aided in the evaluation of each basic event
probability distribution and the associated confidence limits were calculated [4-12].
Each of the basic event probabilities was assumed to have a normal distribution
around this mean value. This is further explored in Section 4.3.3 as part of the
overall uncertainty of the top event probability.
4.3.2 Intermediate Event Probabilities
Each of the Intermediate Event probabilities is calculated at this point using
Equation 2-6. There is only one MPS for each intermediate event in this particular
scenario. Each intermediate event probability is calculated as follows:
Pr(M) = [ Pr(ER) * Pr(l) ] (4-16)
Pr(E) = [ Pr(CS) * Pr(ES) * Pr(II) ] (4-17)
Pr(D) = [ Pr(DE) * Pr(SF)] (4-18)
Pr(F) = [ Pr(DS) * Pr(FE) * Pr(FQ) * Pr(FR)] (4-19)
Pr(U) = [ Pr(DP) * Pr(FI) * Pr(WF) * Pr(WY)] (4-20)
Table 4-11 summarizes the intermediate event probabilities for each
reactor/fuel cycle:
Table 4-11: Intermediate Event Probabilities for each Reactor/Fuel Cycle
2.50E-01 2.42E-02 5.20E-03 I 4.OOE-02
5.42E-02 1.40E-03 4.1OE-05 2.OOE-04
2.25E-02 1.73E-02 5.20E-03 8.80E-03
1.20E-03 9.03E-06 2.65E-07 1.26E-05
2.88E-04 1.45E-05 7.80E-07 3.15E-06
4.3.3 Top Event Proliferation Success Probability
The top event proliferation success probability, Event W, is calculated from
Equation 2-5:
Pr(W) = Pr(M) * Pr(E) e Pr(D) * Pr(F) e Pr(U)
Table 4-12 summarizes the proliferation success probability of each
reactor/fuel cycle:
Table 4-12: Proliferation Success Probability for each Reactor/Fuel Cycle
1.05E-10 I 7.56E-17 I 2.35E-22 I 2.41E-18 I
As stated earlier, an uncertainty analysis was performed using SAPHIRE. A
Monte Carlo technique was used and the results of the analysis are summarized in
Table 4-13:
Table 4-13: Uncertainty Analysis for each Reactor/Fuel Cycle
75000 75000 75000 75000
1.05E-10 7.56E-17 2.35E-22 2.41E-18
1.128E-10 8.12E-17 2.52E-22 2.59E-18
1.46E-12 1.05E-18 3.26E-24 3.35E-20
1.53E-09 1.1 OE-1 5 3.42E-21 3.52E-1 7
1.46E-12 1.05E-18 3.26E-24 3.35E-20
2.66E-1 2 1.91 E-1 8 5.94E-24 6.11 E-20
5.95E-12 4.28E-18 1.33E-23 1.37E-19
1.09E-11 7.86E-18 2.44E-23 2.51E-19
2.OOE-1 1 1.44E-1 7 4.46E-23 4.59E- 19
3.81E-11 2.74E-17 8.52E-23 8.76E-19
4.79E-1 1 3.45E-17 1.07E-22 1.10E-18
5.85E-11 4.21E-17 1.31E-22 1.34E-18
8.26E-11 5.95E-17 1.85E-22 1.90E-18
1.13E-10 8.12E-17 2.52E-22 2.59E-18
1.51E-10 1.09E-16 3.37E-22 3.47E-18
2.06E-1 0 1.48E-1 6 4.59E-22 4.72E-1 8
2.43E-10 1.75E-16 5.43E-22 5.58E-18
2.91E-10 2.09E-16 6.49E-22 6.67E-18
4.54E-1 0 3.27E-1 6 1.01 E-21 1.04E-1 7
6.51E-10 4.69E-16 1.46E-21 1.50E-17
8.79E-10 6.33E-16 1.96E-21 2.02E-17
1.24E-09 8.91E-16 2.77E-21 2.84E-17
1.53E-09 1.10E-15 3.42E-21 3.52E- 17
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Appendix B contains summaries for each reactor/fuel cycle basic event probability
determination, intermediate event probabilities and top event probability calculation.
Appendix C contains each reactor/fuel cycle top event cumulative distribution
function.
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Chapter 5: Comparative Evaluations and Conclusions
5.1 Overview
A comparative assessment of the results of the proliferation risk for each of
the reactor/fuel cycles outlined in Chapter 4 is presented along with the proliferation
resistance and vulnerability ratios developed in Section 2.4. These results suggest
that the reactor/fuel cycles evaluated in comparison to the reference PWR offer a
much lower proliferation risk. Table 5-1 summarizes the proliferation risk for each of
the reactor/fuel cycles:
Table 5-1: Proliferation Risk for each Reactor/Fuel Cycle
1.05E-10 7.56E1 2.35 E-22 2.41 E- 18
1. 128E-10 8.12E-17 2.52E-22 2.59E-18
1.46E-12 1.05E-18 3.26E-24 3.35E-20
1.53E-09 1.10E-15 3.42E-2113.52E-17
Figure 5-1 illustrates the diverse top event probabilities as cumulative distribution
functions.
CDFs for Reactor/Fuel Cycle Options
1.0 -
0.8 -!EM -PWR
0.6 - -RTR-S
0.4 - -PBMR
0.2 || -RTR-B
0.0
1x10- 0 11 24  lx1o 1x10 1x10-18 1x10-16  1x10 14  1x10-12 1x10 1x104 1x10-6 1x10 4  1x10-
2  1.0
Top Event Probability
Figure 5-1: CDFs for Reactor/Fuel Cycle Options
As can be seen in Figure 5-1, the cumulative distribution functions for each of
the reactor/fuel cycle options are identical in shape. This is due to each one having
the same representative function defining this distribution, as the minimal path set
followed for successful employment of a nuclear weapon is the same for each
reactor/fuel cycle. If any other pathways were compared to the plutonium-diversion
from spent fuel pathway, the distribution functions would be different and would vary
in shape. These distribution functions also exhibit the same basic shape because
the uncertainties associated with each basic event were considered equally among
the various reactor/fuel cycle options. If these uncertainties varied from reactor to
reactor, the distributions would also differ.
These minimal top event probabilities suggest clear potential for continued
development of the RTR concept and the PBMR in comparison to the reference
PWR.
5.2 Comparative Evaluations of Proliferation Risk Metrics
5.2.1 Overall Vulnerability Relative to a Reference Case
Each of the reactor/fuel cycles is compared to the reference case PWR in
terms of the discussion in Section 2.4. These results are summarized in Appendix D
with the mean values being used to generate the following proliferation metrics.
The degree to which the i-th reactor/fuel cycle is vulnerable to proliferation is
indicated by the value of Pr(Wi), and its vulnerability relative to a reference
reactor/fuel cycle is indicated by the ratio, R1ji, where
R1; = Pr(Wi) (5-1)Pr(Wo)
where:
Pr(Wi) = the top event probability of the i-th reactor/fuel cycle
Pr(Wo) = the top event probability of the reference PWR
The proliferation vulnerability, R1, for each of the reactor/fuel cycles is
summarized in Table 5-2:
Table 5-2: Proliferation Vulnerability, R1
R 1 3.35E-07 2.06E-13 1.01E-09
The RTR-B enjoys the lowest top event probability and the least vulnerability to
proliferation, R1 as compared to the other reactor/fuel cycles. Both the RTR concept
and the PBMR are very successful in thwarting proliferation attempts due to their
very small intermediate event probabilities and in combination, the top event
probabilities. All three reactor/fuel cycle concepts are orders of magnitude smaller
when compared to the PWR as the difficulty of diverting enough material in the
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proper form is very difficult given proliferation resistant reactor/fuel cycle technical
features. These technical features will be explored more in Section 5.2.2.
It would also be beneficial to determine those events, if there are any, which
contribute the most to the top event probability. This evaluation is performed in
much the same manner as the Fussel-Vesely ratio as seen in reliability analyses.
The contribution of reactor/fuel cycle basic event k to the probability of IEi is given by
the ratio, lik, and defined as:
Prob.(MPS 1 +MPS2 +....+MPSi(-
lik = (5-2)Prob.(IEi)
where:
MPSijk = an MPS containing a basic event, the probability of which is affected
by the k-th reactor/ fuel cycle feature.
The overall measure of the proliferation resistance of a reactor/fuel cycle is
provided by
IPR = Pr(W') (5-3)
where:
W'= [M' * E' * D' * F'* U'], and (5-4)
IEj = [MPS'1 + MPS 2 +....+ MPSj] (5-5)
and where:
MPS'= an MPS containing a reactor/fuel cycle-dependent basic event and
the element of the MPS' sequence from j = 1 through J each
containing at least one such basic event, and the sequence j=1, ..., J
includes all such MPSs for lEi. This information is analogous to that
of the Fussell-Vesely risk importance measure encountered in risk
analyses.
From Equations 5-2 and 5-3, it is seen that the magnitudes of lik and IPR
both depend upon the overall anti-proliferation context of the entire proliferation
prevention program in which the reactor/fuel cycle of interest is involved. Calculation
of the value of each of these measures for this illustrative example will yield a value
of 1 for each and therefore not offer any basis of comparison. Therefore, the
evaluation of Equation 5-2 will yield an answer of 1 for every intermediate event in
this illustrative example. Any comparison to the reference PWR or other reactor/fuel
cycle through the evaluation of Equation 5-3 will also yield an answer of 1. The
inclusion and consideration of these factors for pathways not involving only one
minimal path set is straightforward and should be included in any future work.
5.2.2 Relative Resistance of Reactor/Fuel Cycle Metrics
The technical resistance of each of the reactor/fuel cycles is of utmost
concern to engineers and reactor core designers. In comparison of alternative
reactor/fuel cycles (designed as concepts I and m), one wishes to examine their
relative contributions to IPR, as provided by the ratio, R2, defined as:
R2 Prob.(W' (5-6)LIPR-rj Prob.(W)
where:
IPR-1 or m = the proliferation resistance importance of concept I or m based on
the technical attributes of the reactor/fuel cycle: A, Pr(Y/Yo<x), H,
and R.
In the plutonium-diversion from spent fuel pathway, the basic events affected
by these technical attributes are Events ER, CS, ES, 1l, DE, DS, FA, FR, FQ, DP, Fl,
WF and WY. Each of these basic events affects the technical resistance of the
95
particular reactor/fuel cycle in a different fashion through the factors affecting their
probabilities as seen in Equation 5-6. This evaluation places a high degree of
emphasis on the critical mass production rate, N, the spontaneous neutron
generation rate, SF, the decay heat generation, DH, and the relative cost of handling
and separating the weapons-usable materials, R. In doing so, the most basic
reactor design characteristics and data can be used to form a comparative
evaluation of which design is most technically favorable. Table 5-3 summarizes
these results for the reference PWR case, concept I and the other reactor/fuel
cycles, concepts m.
Table 5-3: Proliferation Resistance, R2
18 244 4
These results highlight the technical features of the RTR-B, namely its
attractiveness and the isotopic concentrations of the spent fuel, as it enjoys the most
technical proliferation resistance as compared to the other reactor/fuel cycle
concepts. The RTR-B has this advantage technically due to the small number of
critical masses it produces annually. Even though its technical characteristics are
very similar to the RTR-S, its critical mass production rate is four times smaller than
that of the RTR-S. The RTR-B also has a long refueling period as the fuel rods are
kept in the reactor for ten years, thereby allowing very few opportunities to divert the
material.
The technical resistance of the PBMR is discounted heavily in this metric, as
its material attractiveness is eight times that of the RTR-B and twice that of the RTR-
S. This is due to the large number of critical masses, N, produced annually by the
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reactor. This number does not take into account the number of modular reactors
needed to have equivalent electricity output. Ten modular reactors would be needed
and therefore would generate ten times the amount of critical masses each year,
bringing the material attractiveness nearly three times lower than that of the PWR.
This does not however, imply that the PBMR is a critical mass factory as suggested
by many due to its online refueling practices. The number of pebbles needed for
diversion would be extraordinarily large in comparison to the number of fuel
assemblies needed from the reference PWR or the RTR concept, making diversion
more noticeable with the PBMR. This illustrative analysis does not include time as a
factor in dealing with diversion as one of the key elements of evaluation. This
inclusion of time would be straightforward as the probabilities of each basic event
could be time dependent as well as resource dependent. A time modulating function
could be used in much the same manner as the material attractiveness function.
Had this been included, the PBMR would have a much better technical resistance
metric.
In summary, each one of the reactor/fuel cycles evaluated along the
plutonium-diversion from spent fuel pathway shows remarkable proliferation
resistance as compared to the reference PWR. These probabilities are mainly
affected by the attractiveness ratio of the plutonium produced by each concept and
the difficulty of fabricating a weapon with a consistently predictable yield. The
diversionary tactics used by potential proliferators are not considered in reference to
time and therefore do not take into consideration the number of diversion attempts
needed to gain a critical mass of weapons-usable material.
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5.3 Evaluation of Probabilistic Method
The probabilistic method presented here is an attempt to quantify those
aspects, both technical and subjective, relating to the overall proliferation risk of a
reactor/fuel cycle. This method incorporates all possible pathways necessary for
developing a nuclear weapon for any level of proliferator. These pathways begin
with the creation of the weapons-useable material and culminate with the actual
explosion of the weapon, either in a test or in a political/military action. This method
is successful in these assessments as it permits logically consistent integration of
those events leading to explosion of the weapon, inclusion of uncertainty as a basis
for subjectivity, sensitivity analyses to determine those areas where performance
can be improved, and inclusion of any reactor/fuel cycle or would-be proliferator.
Uncertainty exists in almost all the factors affecting the basic event
probabilities, and subsequently, the top event probability has a degree of sensitivity
based on these uncertainties. It is obvious that any such assessment involving
nation states' interactions and economic disparities will have subjectivity at the heart
of any such evaluation. Therefore, the need for detailed metrics for each factor
affecting the probabilities would continue to be determined through subjective
analysis with a certain degree of confidence at each point. For example, the time
scales for diversion could be included through a subjective analysis of the likelihood
of diversion of a critical mass given levels of safeguards and resources devoted.
Each time would have an associated probability with a given confidence as to this
value. This degree of uncertainty, if applied logically and consistently, among
various levels of proliferators and types of reactor/fuel cycles, would be included in
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the analysis in much the same manner as metrics determined from each reactor/fuel
cycle technical specifications.
This method also allows an evaluator to determine those reactor/fuel cycle
technical aspects or political/economic decisions which may have the greatest value
in formulating strategies for deterring future proliferation. In doing so, those events
affecting the top event the most (i.e., the highest valued proliferation resistance
metric, R2 or those having high values from Equation 2-20) can be focused on to
further extenuate the top event probability for would-be proliferators.
5.4 Conclusions
The future of the commercial nuclear power industry is heavily reliant on
mitigating the concerns about high costs, reactor-accident risks, radioactive-waste
management, and potential links to the spread of nuclear weapons. For nuclear
power to be successful well into this century, specific measures must be undertaken
to analyze these factors and provide quantitative assessments of their impact so that
informed decisions may be made to guide the future of nuclear power.
As seen in the illustrative example presented in this work, the prospects for
developing new reactor/fuel cycle concepts that are more proliferation resistant that
the current PWRs are great. The current PWR design already offers a significant
barrier to the proliferation of weapons-useable material. The results presented in
this work offer promise to future systems that significantly overshadow even these
well-respected barriers in existence today. Several key areas have also been
identified where improvements in management or pathway inspection can further
reduce the risk of proliferation.
Intermediate Events F and U only contain one minimal path set each. These
intermediate events offer several opportunities to affect the top event probabilities or
render these events impossible. Each one of the minimal path sets contains four
basic events and a defeat of any one of the eight will completely arrest a potential
proliferators attempt at successfully employing a weapon.
The isotopic concentrations and composition of the spent fuel are key
elements in evaluating the material attractiveness, A, and the formulation of an
effective weapon based on the probability of a predictable yield. To note, the high
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fuel burn-up of both the seed and blanket in the RTR relative to that in the reference
PWR results in a substantial decrease in the plutonium present in RTR spent fuel,
and to substantial increases in the percentages of 238Pu, 240Pu and 242 Pu.
Most notably, however, is the existence of many "bottlenecks" within each
diversion pathway. Figure 3-1 outlines these bottlenecks in terms of acquiring the
weapons-useable material from a commercial nuclear power source. These areas
should receive high future emphasis regardless of other proliferation resistance
features being developed inherent to the reactor/fuel cycle technical features.
The comparative quantitative assessment of the proliferation risk presented in
this work offers a consistent and logical evaluation of reactor/fuel cycles and
pathways available to would-be proliferators. The example and results presented
are an illustration of an integrated analysis utilizing a probabilistic method. The
subjectivity used in determining various factors and confidence levels for this
analysis is based on the author's own reasoning, opinion and judgment in light of
political, economic and technical considerations. The results, implications and
conclusions concerning different reactor/fuel cycles are applicable only within the
context of this subjectivity as applied within this methodology.
This method has been presented as an attempt to further the goals of
physicists and engineers interested in developing the next generation of commercial
nuclear power systems. These analyses, combined with ongoing research into the
cost, safety and waste management aspects, allow for the development of
coordinated strategies for providing the population with a cheaper, safer, easier to
manage and more proliferation resistant source of energy using nuclear power.
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5.5 Areas for Further Research
There are areas within the framework of the methodology that could be
improved upon through future research. Many of the subjective areas that have
been evaluated could be refined to include more metrics, other than resources, in an
attempt to better quantify the "competition" between proliferators and safeguarders.
These metrics could be country or region specific and integrated into assessments
of countries across a wide range of materials, resources and reactor/fuel cycles.
The modulating function associated with the material attractiveness, A, could be
improved upon to better relate the ratio of attractiveness of one weapons-useable
material to another instead of one reactor/fuel cycle to another
The illustrative example presented in Chapter 4 is only one of many material
and proliferation pathways that could be explored. Dozens of combinations of
materials, resources and pathways exist that have yet to be analyzed. Many of
these combinations of resources, materials and proliferators should be further
pursued in hopes of helping further the research needed for the development of the
next generation of nuclear power. However, with the current world situation, there
also exists a need for analyses to determine the prospect of those countries labeled
as "high risk" and those rogue nations or organizations that might try to develop
weapons of mass destruction as a means for further terrorist activities. The use of
2 35U in a simple gun-type design that many rogue nations or terrorists would find
attractive is one key area that seems worthy of future work.
One final area of future work deals with the time scales for diversion. The
time needed for diversion of the appropriate amount of weapons-useable material
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was not included as a metric in this illustrative example. The time scales could play
a very important role in assessing the diversion potential, as has been mentioned
earlier concerning the PBMR. The availability of resources, in conjunction with the
time scales for diversion, could propel any of the reactor/fuel cycle concepts ahead
of the others when considering them in the context of differing technical
infrastructures or nation states.
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Appendix A: Calculation Data for Important Factors and
Basic Event Probabilities
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Appendix B: Summary of Basic, Intermediate and Top Event Probabilities
For Each Reactor/Fuel Cycle
Pathway: Weapons-Useable Material from Spent Fuel Diverted During Storage
Weapon Material Is
M Created
Fuel Cycle PWR
Fissile Material: Pu
Basic
Event nEvt
EE Frirtile Material Is Extracted from Earth
ER Frtile Material Is Extracted from Spent Fuel
I E'tracted Fertile Material is Irradiated in Reactor
ME Weapon Material Is Enriched Successfully
0 Weapon Material Is Extracted from Earth
RD A
0.50 1.00
0.50
...........
0.2500
Usable Weapon
Material Is Obatined
From Its Source
Fissile Weapon
D Material Is Diverted
F Weapon Is Fabricated
CS Material Is Separated Chemically
EA Ei richment Facilities Are Available
EN Eirichment Resources Are Available
ES E' traction Safeguards Are Eluded
It Created Material Isotropic Concentrations Are Sat
RM R!cycled Materials Are Enriched
XI Material Isotopic Concentrations Are Sat
XP S pplier Provides Material
XS Ap plicable Safeguards Are Eluded
DE D version Safeguards Are Eluded
PF D versoin Occurs At Production Facility
SF D version Occurs At Storage Facility
T D'version Occurs During Transportation
DS Disign Is Adequate
FA Fabrication Facilities Are Available
FR Fabrication Resources Are Available
FQ F abricated Weapon Quality Is Adequate
Weapon Is
Used/Tested
DP Weapon Is Deployed
FI Weapon Is Fired
WF Weapon Successfully Ignites
WY Weapon Yield Is Satisfactory
RD
Prob [Y/o Q(E,G)
< x] I Extract
0.50 0.90 0.97
.......................... ~K~~jjj ~ :::.
0.50 0.90 . V 090 1.00
0.610.50 o 61_
N
0.4364
0.4050
0.3065
E 00542
Q(E,G)
RD H Storage
0.50 0.90 01
0.50 0.10LLg~Wg
Prob Q(EG) Q(E,G)
RD A IY/Yo < x] Fabric Diversion
0.50 061 s ...
0.50 1.00 .2.% 26 025 M :
0.50 ... . .50
0.50 1.00 2%!$ 0.25 )$$
Prob Q(E,G)
RD A [YNo < x1 Use
0.50 1.00 (|Wdl!6||0.10
0.50 $0.61 0.10
0.50 0.61 igL Jj.61|Eiig.j
E: 0.0225
0.3065
0.12500.2500
0.1250
0.0500
0.0307
0.3065
0.6130
El .20E-03
E2.88E-04
M .E-10
Pathway: Weapons-Useable Material from Spent Fuel Diverted During Storage
INIVE IMEPA~Th~MNT j 4; mt &' .,,F~cw A........nt.........I4
Fuel Cycle: RTR-S
Fissile Material: Pu
El pAM.....
Weapon Material is
M Created
Usable Weapon
Material Is Obatined
E From Its Source
Fissile Weapon
D Material Is Diverted
EE Frtile Material Is Extracted from Earth
ER Firtile Material Is Extracted from Spent Fuel
I Extracted Fertile Material is Irradiated in Reactor
ME Weapon Material Is Enriched Successfully
o Weapon Material Is Extracted from Earth
CS Material Is Separated Chemically
EA Eirichment Facilities Are Available
EN Eirichment Resources Are Available
ES Extraction Safeguards Are Eluded
|1 Created Material Isotropic Concentrations Are Sat
RM Rcycled Materials Are Enriched
XI Material Isotopic Concentrations Are Sat
XP Sipplier Provides Material
XS Aoplicable Safeguards Are Eluded
DE Diversion Safeguards Are Eluded
PF Diversoin Occurs At Production Facility
SF Diversion Occurs At Storage Facility
T Diversion Occurs During Transportation
RD A
0.50 0.10
0.50 r+:wvs:
Prob Q(E,G)
RD H R [YNo <x] Extract A
A Enl A SO A 07 l~iM*s6*4. Xi 9 a."'.'. *. >
05n an i 69s a .snseei a i ni
I 050 f652 iiiiiiia~i 1 i~l~l 049 ~i44~t*s.I5*~i4~aiiz%:s.i4ill
I .I.,,...+. I I
......>&~ *A 4 .~ *>6>>~4/~.~ .'.y.4>.... .>% 44'
.>4>: 59±W
6>
WflX: ..rxr'sx "~aY'~'WY'
Q(E,G)
RD H Stora e
0.50 0.69
0.50 0.10
Event]
0.04 84
0.5000
0.335I6
0.0 167
0.24 62
0.3,154
-0.0i500
F Weapon Is Fabricated
Design Is Adequate
Fbrication Facilities Are Available
Fibrication Resources Are Available
Fabricated Weapon Quality Is Adequate
Weapon Is
Used/Tested
DP Weapon Is Deployed
FI Weapon Is Fired
WF Weapon Successfully Ignites
WY Weapon Yield Is Satisfactory
Prob Q(E,G) Q(E,G)
RD A [Y/Yo < x) Fabric Diversion
0.50 $:%$' 9 0.49 i3! I
0.50 0.10 :4!!!!$ 0.25 0.50
0.50 ! 2 1)! !!!!!$ig!. 3%!!% 0.0
0.50 0.10 g!!!j|iii 0.25 gfj|||
Prob Q(E,G)
RD A [Y/Yo < x Use
0.50 .1 j 0.10
0.50 0.49 0.10
0.50 0.49
W isi||$ii|id !! g $$~is 0.49 --'--- ---||
0.2462
0.0121
0.250
0.0 219.03E-06
0.01 73
LI 0.0242
.... tJ .L 7.5E-05
.n :Q : i
,
0.0048
0.0246
0.24162
0.4~2 L.5E0
Pathiway: Weapons-Useable Material from Spent Fuel Diverted During Storage
mini ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ A PONl-~~ -I FatnAlII tntRa.iii
Fuel Cycle:
Fissile Material:
Pu
PttObtblJi 7ZIfl
Weapon Matcrial Is
M Created
Usable Werpon
Material Is Ob atined
E From Its Sorce
Fissile Werpon
D Material Is Diverted
Fertile Material Is Extracted from Earth
Fertile Material Is Extracted from Spent Fuel
Extracted Fertile Material is Irradiated in Reactor
Weapon Material Is Enriched Successfully
Weapon Material Is Extracted from Earth
Material Is Separated Chemically
Enrichment Facilities Are Available
Enrichment Resources Are Available
Extraction Safeguards Are Eluded
Created Material Isotropic Concentrations Are Sat
Recycled Materials Are Enriched
Material Isotopic Concentrations Are Sat
Supplier Provides Material
Applicable Safeguards Are Eluded
Diversion Safeguards Are Eluded
Diversoin Occurs At Production Facility
Diversion Occurs At Storage Facility
Diversion Occurs During Transportation
RD A
0.50 0.02
0.50 . ... ..
Prob Q(E,G)
RD H R {Y/Yo < x] Extract A
0.50 0.42 0.97
0.50 0.42 1 .30 0.02
Q(E,G)
RD H Storage
0.50 0.42 E irs
0.50 0%!$ . 05
[flEMESj S r 5efi20J
F Weapon Is Fat ricateci
Design Is Adequate
Fabrication Facilities Are Available
Fabrication Resources Are Available
Fabricated Weapon Quality Is Adequate
Weapon Is
Used/Tested
Weapon Is Deployed
Weapon Is Fired
Weapon Successfully Ignites
Weapon Yield Is Satisfactory
Prob Q(EG) Q(E,G)
RD A [Y/Yo < x] Fabric Diversion
0.50 !si$eg 0.31 .igf~e . ii@s$s ! 
0.50 0.02 s$i$t4isj 0.25
0.50 $29%! s $gfii!2ii@ 0.50
0.50 0.02 | 0.25 g
Prob Q(E,G)
RD A YNo < x Use0.50 0.10
0.50 %@$il2 0.31 0.10
0.50 F-25tti 031li'.'! '
g!$5gy gj~~j61x< .3 - -'g
.... . .2.35E-22
RTR-B
Pu
tEvent
L0.0052
Basic
Event
0.0105
0.5000
0.2037
0.0013
0.1551
..
L .0000
L 0.0052
0.1551
0.0026
0.25000.0026I
LE2.65E-07
L7.80E-o7
Pathway: Weapons-Useable Material from Spent Fuel Diverted During Storage
L (MjNj I ~tiA$4- N.4T 1;'~' *t~teiiai tettfbkit
Fuel Cycle: PBMR
Fissile Material: Pu
Weapon Material Is
M Created
Usable Weapon
Material Is Obatined
E From Its Source
FIsslie Weapon
D Material Is Diverted
Fertile Material Is Extracted from Earth
Fertile Material Is Extracted from Spent Fuel
Extracted Fertile Material is Irradiated in Reactor
Weapon Material Is Enriched Successfully
Weapon Material Is Extracted from Earth
Material Is Separated Chemically
Enrichment Facilities Are Available
Enrichment Resources Are Available
Extraction Safeguards Are Eluded
Created Material Isotropic Concentrations Are Sat
Recycled Materials Are Enriched
Material Isotopic Concentrations Are Sat
Supplier Provides Material
Applicable Safeguards Are Eluded
Diversion Safeguards Are Eluded
Diversoin Occurs At Production Facility
Diversion Occurs At Storage Facility
Diversion Occurs During Transportation
RD A
0.50 0.16
0.50 $isM
Prob Q(E,G)
RD H R [YYo < x] Extract A
0.50 0.35 0.79
" _ I
0.50 1 0.35 I ?~Y$0 0.35 1 0.16 I
Basic
Event
0.0801
0.5000
0.1391
0.0099
0.1253
I I I ......~. ~ I'5: :~5:5., Ir~ ., .x...4..k-.4...::..:5 ..~.s: '~5 '<S '*a4* '5r....
1
'~
~*wa;s ~ ~ &.si*t. Z4>~'X:Y.*.
*5~ s*::: 5:. 5S..5k*.5$5
lnEv
E:0.0400
0.0002
Q(E,G)
RD H Storage
0.50 0.35 isisss
0.50 si .10 L 0.0088
F Weapon Is Fabricated
DS Design Is Adequate
FA Fabrication Facilities Are Available
FR Fabrication Resources Are Available
FQ Fabricated Weapon Quality Is Adequate
Weapon Is
Used/Tested
DP Weapon Is Deployed
Fi Weapon Is Fired
WF Weapon Successfully Ignites
WY Weapon Yield Is Satisfactory
Prob Q(EG) Q(E,G)
RD A [Y/Yo < x] Fabric Diversion
0.50 2' 0.25
0.50 0. 16 .! i. ! 0.25 W .si%!!is
0.50 's i ss .i 0.50
0.50 0.16 'i!.'>"gw. 0.25
Prob Q(EG)
RD A [YYo < x] Use
0.50 0.16 < > 0.10
0.50 M *Oi 0.25 0.10
0.50 5 i 025
S!igg 0.25
EL.26E-05
0.0080
_0_0125
0.1253
0.2505 15E-6 |
112
Appendix C: Cumulative Distribution Functions for Each Reactor/Fuel Cycle
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Appendix D: Summary of Reactor/Fuel Cycle Probabilities with
Proliferation Metrics
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Pathway: Weapons-Useable Material from Spent Fuel Diverted During Storage
Weapon Material is
M Created
ER Fertile Material Is Extracted from Spent Fuel A RD 0 5000 0.0484 0.0105 0.0801
I Extracted Fertile Material is Irradiated in Reactor RD 0 5000 0.5000 0.5000 0.5000
Weapon Material Is Created=>M 0.2500 0.0242 0.0052 0.0400
Usable Weapon
Material Is Obatined
E From its Source
CS Material Is Separated Chemically RD H, R 0.4364 0.3356 0.2037 0.1391
ES Extraction Safequards Are Eluded RD, Qextrac 0.4050 0.0167 0.0013 0.0099
It Created Material Isotropic Conc. Are Sat RD. PfY/Yo<xl 0.3065 0.2462 0.1551 0.1253
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